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MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT

URBAN/MUNICIPAL

This is a transcript of the proceedings at a public meeting held in connection with the Chipman incident on January 21st, 1986, held at St. Francis Xavier School, Stoney Creek, on the 25th of March, 1986.

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
Meeting re Chipman incident - March 25, 1986

Items to be inserted/checked in transcript

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	
3	5/6	First sentence of Chairman's opening needs inserting.
77	16	Air monitoring equipment at Barton andStreet
87	20	Brian Litton, Executive Director of.....
100	8	Name of speaker - it might have been continuation of Chairman's answer.
100	20/21	Name of speaker required.
101	13	Name of speaker required.
106	20	Name of Avenue on which Peter Dunn lives required.
113	8	Name of speaker required.
114	9	Name of speaker required.
122	18	Name of speaker required -- may still be Doctor Balsillie.
139	11)	Name of speaker required -- Fire Chief or Police Superintendent.
	)	
140	3)	
142	22	Name of speaker required.
144	9	Name of speaker required.
145	8/9	Name of speaker required. (May be John Balloch.
150	2	Name of speaker required.
152	18	Name of speaker required.
154	2	Name of speaker required.
155	9	Name of speaker required.
156	7/8	Name of speaker required.

NB : Handwritten insertions/corrections appear in the text.

J. Maclellan



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MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT

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Stoney Creek, on the 25th of
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CHAIRMAN: Mr. Adrian TUMBER

APPEARANCES:

The Honourable	Minister of
Mr. James Bradley	the Environment
The Honourable	Minister of
Mr. William Wrye	Labour
Mr. Ray Jenkins	Ministry of Labour
Mr. Jack King	Chipman Chemical
Mr. Ray Plant	Region of Hamilton-Wentworth
Doctor Ian Cunningham	Medical Officer of Health
Mr. Boris Boyko	Ministry of the Environment

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185 Richmond Street West
Toronto, Ontario
M5V 1V3

Per: J. Caldicott, CVR



MARCH 25, 1986

STONEY CREEK, Ontario

--- (UPON COMMENCING AT 7:45 P.M.)

(NB: ALL OF FIRST
SENTENCE NOT
AVAILABLE)

on January 21st of this year. As I'm sure all of you know there were some emissions from the plant at that time and a small evacuation was ordered in the area of Stoney Creek.

The way in which we will proceed with our meeting this evening is that we will, first of all, hear from two Ontario Cabinet Ministers: -- but first of all I'd like to recognize a number of people.

First of all, Mayor Stan Napper, the Mayor of Stoney Creek.

I also recognize Mr. Bill Sears, who's the Regional Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Sears.

And finally I would like to indicate that we have heard that Mayor Morrow and counsel from the City of Hamilton will be joining us.

We are very pleased this evening to have present with us The Honourable Bill Wrye and The Honourable Jim Bradley. Mr. Wrye is the Minister of Labour and Mr. Bradley the Minister of the Environment, and I call on Mr. Jim Bradley for his opening remarks.



1
2 THE HONOURABLE MR. JIM BRADLEY:

3 Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the mercifully
4 brief introduction, which I think is all that's
5 necessary this evening. I should indicate, as well,
6 that your Member of the Legislative Assembly, Mr.
7 Gordon Dean, who directed questions to me in the
8 House concerning the Chipman incident, is present
9 tonight, and Gord, maybe you'd like to stand up
so that everybody can see you're here.

10 I want to say, first of all, that
11 I'm extremely pleased that we have this many people
12 here this evening. I was told by a former resident
13 of Stoney Creek that whenever there's a meeting
14 of any kind of public interest in Stoney Creek,
15 that you can count on a good delegation of people
16 will be present. It's quite obvious that the incident
17 that occurred at the Chipman plant is one which
18 is of great concern to very many people in this
19 particular auditorium, and perhaps some who were
20 unable to make it here this evening as well. So
21 it certainly counts for the fact that you'd be here
22 to hold those of us who have public office accountable
for our actions and accountable for what future
actions we might take.

23 One of the undertakings that I
24 gave very early to your local municipality, to Mayor
25 Stan Napper and to Chairman Sears, was that I would




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2 personally appear at and see that there was a public
3 hearing held, a public meeting of this kind, where
4 there were representatives of both the Provincial
5 Government and the Municipal Government.

6 In our case, the Provincial
7 Government naturally is the Ministry of the
8 Environment, which has people here this evening;
9 the Ministry of the Environment, of course, which
10 is responsible for environmental concerns; the
11 Ministry of Labour, which is responsible for
12 occupational health and safety, that which takes
13 place immediately in the plant and the plant
14 territory; the Ministry of Health, which has a role
15 to play, obviously, in an incident of this kind;
16 the Ministry of the Solicitor General which is
17 co-ordinating, for instance, your police and fire
18 activities in the Province of Ontario.

19 So we do have representation from
20 those four areas, as well as Municipal
21 representatives. And as I indicated to you in the
22 very beginning of my remarks, those of us who are
23 in public office must be accountable to you, in
24 this case people who live in the Stoney Creek area
25 and beyond the borders of Stoney Creek, for the
activities over which we have responsibility. That
is why we are here this evening.

One of the things that we'll be



1
2 doing is, first of all, explaining what happened
3 as far as we are concerned. We want to tell you
4 what went wrong, we want to tell you what we think
5 went right, and, third, we want to tell you what
6 we're going to do to correct those things that went
7 wrong.

8 It's my view that political
9 representatives are very unwise to attempt to fool
10 the people of any particular area. I think in 1986
11 people are educated to the fact that we have some
12 significant environmental and health problems that
13 confront us, and it has always been my view that
14 we must be 'up front' with these problems. We are
15 not the Ministry of Defence, we are the Ministry
16 of the Environment, for instance, in our case. It's
17 our responsibility to tell you all of the facts
18 surrounding this particular matter, and these will
19 be revealed by our people who are here this evening,
20 who will then be subject to questions from all who
21 are assembled here.


22 I also want to indicate to you
23 that as far as our Ministry is concerned, we have
24 been deeply involved from the beginning of this
25 incident. I indicated in the Ontario Legislature
and, I think, publicly, that I was not entirely
satisfied with the performance of my Ministry in
this particular incident. In my view we did not



1
2 respond as quickly as we should have, first of all;
3 and secondly, as thoroughly as we might have. But
4 rather than simply make excuses, and rather than
5 simply try to explain away what happened, I'm here
6 to indicate to you, through my officials, what we
7 are going to do to correct the situation. And I'm
8 here to listen very carefully to what you, the people
9 of Stoney Creek and surrounding area, have to say;
10 the advice that you want to offer, the questions
11 that you're going to ask, the suggestions that you
12 make. All will be valuable to us in attempting to
13 address what I consider to be a serious situation
14 and one which requires future action which is
15 different from what which was in the past.

14 Now I'll very quickly indicate
15 to you three areas we intend to improve
16 considerably from the point of view of our Ministry:
17 first of all, the response time, I indicated to
18 you, was not satisfactory, and that is why we have
19 improved what is called our "Spills Action Centre".

20 In the specific incident that
21 happened we had a telephone connection, of all nights,
22 that would not operate correctly on the first line
23 coming in. It meant that if you were calling in
24 to the second line you might well have hit a "busy"
25 signal. So the first thing we had to improve --
and it will be explained to you by our officials




1
2 -- was the Spills Action Centre Hotline -- to tell
3 you how we're improving that.

4 The second is the co-ordination
5 of our activities, both with the Municipality and
6 with other Ministries. That's exceedingly important,
7 that we work together as a team, have the best
8 possible communication.

9 The third is the availability of
10 equipment. You may recall, through news media reports,
11 that one of the things I indicated, that I think
12 many people were surprised at, was that the TAGA
13 unit, the large "sniffer" if you want to call it
14 that, that we have available in the Province of
15 Ontario, is not built or constructed to respond
16 to emergency situations. Rather it monitors on a
17 weekly or twice-weekly -- you can have it in one
18 area two or three weeks at a time -- to monitor
19 the air in a specific area, because it must be set
20 to look for specific substances.

21 Well, I indicated in the House,
22 and subsequent to that, that I wanted to see our
23 Ministry scour the world to see if there were not
24 an emergency piece of equipment which would assist
25 us in a situation of this kind. Our Ministry was
able to find such a piece of equipment, which I
think will be exceedingly helpful. It's called a
Portable Ambient Air Analyzer. And we have, by the



1
2 way, purchased eight of these for the Province of
3 Ontario, so they can be stationed across the Province
4 of Ontario, at a cost of \$200,000, approximately
5 \$25,000 apiece.

6 Now our Ministry officials will
7 indicate to you how that can be used and how we
8 think it will improve these circumstances.

9 I want to publicly thank all of
10 those who I've been able to consult with in this
11 matter. Some of you have sent me letters, which
12 I have found very helpful. Some have made
13 representation to our Ministry officials directly,
14 the word has come back to me. Representatives in
15 the Ontario Legislature from various ridings in
16 and around Stoney Creek have directed questions
17 to me and I've chatted with them about some of the
18 possible solutions to our problems. And, of course,
19 your Municipal authorities I've met with, both at
20 the staff level and at the political level.

21 I hope that from this particular
22 incident, an incident of great concern to me and,
23 I know, of very direct concern to you, that we can
24 learn and that we can improve. I assure you tonight
25 that the facts will be placed before you, and that
your suggestions will be listened to with a good
deal of care.

Thank you very much for your concern

(PAGE 11 FOLLOWS)



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2 and for coming out tonight.


3 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
4 much, Mr. Bradley. I will now call on The Honourable
5 Bill Wrye, the Minister of Labour, for some opening
6 remarks.

7 Mr. Wrye?

8 THE HONOURABLE MR. WILLIAM WRYE:
9 Thank you very much, Adrian, and my colleague in
10 Cabinet, Jim Bradley, and Gordon Dean. And I did
11 want to note that my colleague in the House from
12 Hamilton East, Bob MacKenzie, was here. Bob, would
13 you stand up, I saw you over in that corner.

14 Ladies and Gentlemen, I want to thank
15 you very much for the opportunity to join with you
16 tonight and to participate, along with my officials,
17 in this important public dialogue. As you know,
18 a number of agencies have been involved in the
19 investigation and in the analysis of events that
20 took place at Chipman and in the immediate community
21 on January 21st last.

22 Our involvement in the Ministry of
23 Labour in this incident has been from the perspective
24 of the health and safety of the workers in the Chipman
25 plant. And I say that because I want to say that
the comments are against the backdrop of some 170,000
work places in our Province, and with regard to
each and every one of those work places our Ministry,



1
2 through its administration of the Occupational Health
3 and Safety Act, about which you will hear quite
4 a bit tonight, I would think -- is responsible for
5 helping to ensure that workers are protected from
6 'on the job' injury and illnesses.

7 In just a few minutes Ray Jenkins,
8 who is from our Ministry's Hamilton Office, will
9 provide you with a detailed account of the Ministry's
10 involvement in the January 21st Chipman incident,
11 and will be able to discuss that involvement fully
12 with you.

13 For the moment let me just in my
14 opening remarks simply say that a full investigation
15 has been conducted; that a number of orders have
16 been issued; and that our investigation reports
17 are currently being actively and intensively assessed
18 with a view towards potential prosecution.

19 Ladies and Gentlemen, let me just
20 say that one of the most important things the Chipman
21 incident underscores is the need for effective
22 legislation that provides workers and the community
23 with a comprehensive 'right to know' about potentially
24 hazardous materials, devices and processes in the
25 work place. On behalf of the Government I had the
honour of introducing such legislation at the end
of January. I'd just like to briefly outline the
four principal elements for workers in that



1
2 legislation, so you understand.

3 First:

4 Each work place will be required
5 to establish and to maintain a central
6 inventory of all the potentially
7 hazardous substances or agents that
8 are on or could be generated on those
9 premises.

10 And secondly:

11 These inventories will be provided
12 to the Ministry of Labour and to
13 the appropriate fire departments
14 and medical health units.

15 The inventories will be available
16 for the information of the workers
17 and will also assist the Government
18 in many of its various activities.

19 Secondly, the bill requires that:

20 Each container of a potentially
21 hazardous substance in the work place
22 and each source of a potentially
23 hazardous physical agent be fully
24 and clearly identified with warning
25 labels that are readily understandable
to the workers.

Third, the bill requires material



1
2 safety data sheets for each potentially hazardous
3 substance or agent. to be in an accessible place
4 in the work place.

5 These data sheets will contain a
6 clear statement of potential hazards,
7 cautions and necessary first-aid
8 information, and they must be available
9 in English and in the majority language
10 of the work place where English is
11 not the first language understood
12 by the majority working in that work
13 place.

14 And finally the legislation creates
15 an obligation to provide appropriate training programs
16 for the workers who are exposed or who are likely
17 to be exposed to the work place hazards.

18 Now that's what happens with "right
19 to know" in the work place, but central to that
20 legislation and to the need for community "right
21 to know", that emerges so clearly in an incident
22 like Chipman, is the requirement of an employer
23 to make and maintain an inventory of all hazardous
24 materials that are present, handled and used and
25 stored in the work place. That inventory will have
to identify both biological and chemical agents
by precise scientific names, and indicate all areas
of the work place where the material may be present,



1
2 used, handled or stored.


3 In addition, the names of the people
4 who prepared the inventory and the date that it
5 was completed, will have to be stated. And if there
6 are any changes in the materials in the plant, the
7 inventory will have to be changed in 15 days.

8 The bill, as I said, requires that
9 the inventory be posted in the work place, be
10 furnished to the workers, and filed with our Ministry,
11 but beyond that it is critical to note that the
12 bill will require that employer to furnish the
13 inventory to the local fire departments and Medical
14 Officers of Health, and here's where you come in.

15 The bill requires that upon the request
16 of any person -- and in this situation, any person
17 in this room -- the most recent version of an
18 inventory that has been furnished to the Medical
19 Officer of Health, shall be made available by the
20 Medical Officer for inspection by the person who
21 has asked to see the inventory.

22 Ladies and Gentlemen, the bill, in
23 short, is far reaching, and will have positive health
24 and safety implications for workers and communities
25 throughout the Province; implications which you
can see, I think, very clearly, as a result of an
incident such as the one at Chipman on January 21st.

I look forward to the discussions



1
2 that will continue, as does my colleague, Mr. Bradley.
3 We think this is a very important occasion and we
4 look forward to, first of all, as Jim has suggested,
5 outlining to you what we have learned and what we
6 intend to do from this incident, and also hearing
7 your suggestions and your proposals, which will
8 help us take even further steps.

9 Thank you very much for the invitation
10 to be here tonight.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
12 much indeed, Mr. Wrye.

13 I'd like now to take a moment or
14 two to explain to you the way in which the rest
15 of this meeting will take place.

16 The first thing is that we will have
17 a series of fairly formal presentations being
18 presented by a group of people who can illustrate
19 certain aspects of the Chipman incident, which I
20 am sure will be of interest to you.

21 Following that time we will have
22 a short break, a break of about 15 minutes, and
23 during that period I would invite any of you who
24 wish to make statements or to ask questions, to
25 identify yourselves to me -- I'll be here in the
hall -- and ask you then if you would let me put
your name on my list, so that I can call on you
at the appropriate time to ask questions of a panel



1
2 that we will have convened here at that time.

3 But before we get to that, I'd like
4 to introduce to you the people who will be making
5 the more formal presentations before the break.

6 In the order in which they'll be
7 speaking we will have, first of all, Mr. Ray Jenkins,
8 who is the Administrative Manager of the Industrial
9 Health and Safety Branch of the Ministry of Labour.


10 Secondly -- and this will be a change
11 from the list you'll see in your program -- the
12 second speaker will be Mr. Jack King, who is the
13 President of Chipman.

14 The third speaker will be Ray Plant,
15 who is the Regional Solicitor for the Region of
16 Hamilton-Wentworth.

17 Our next speaker will be Doctor Ian
18 Cunningham, who is the Medical Officer of Health.

19 And finally, Mr. Boris Boyko, who
20 is the Regional Director of the Ministry of the
21 Environment.

22 In order that we can get on as quickly
23 as possible to perhaps the most important part of
24 the meeting, which is the open part, which will
25 occur, of course, after the break, I would ask that
you perhaps hold your questions during this first
part, so we can have more time available for you
to ask those questions after the break.



1
2 So without more ado, then, let me
3 call on Mr. Ray Jenkins for his presentation.

4 MR. RAY JENKINS: Thank you, Mr.
5 Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen. This is not exactly
6 the Academy Awards, but nevertheless...

7 My name is Ray Jenkins. I'm with
8 the Industrial Health and Safety Branch of the Ontario
9 Ministry of Labour. I'm with the Occupational Health
10 and Safety Division, and my presentation will be
11 brief, it's between 10 and 15 minutes at the most,
12 I've been told. I will talk about jurisdiction,
13 and the investigation that we did, and then the
14 conclusion. There are a number of Ministries here
15 this evening, and the people from the Municipalities
16 and the Towns, so what I will take the liberty of
17 doing, in order to prevent any confusion with
18 questions for the panel a little later on -- I'll
19 give you a brief activity of what we do as a Branch
20 and what our jurisdiction is.

21 We enforce and administer the
22 Occupational Health and Safety Act, where the
23 principal mandate is for the protection of workers'
24 health and safety. I realize Mr. Wrye has just
25 mentioned that. And although we are for ever mindful
about the effects that industrial establishments
can have on the public, our role, nevertheless,
is to protect the health and safety of the worker



1
2 in the work place.

3 As you are well aware, on the evening
4 of January 21st, at about 6:48, a fire -- I'll call
5 it a "fire" -- a fire started in a piece of process
6 equipment called an ALL-FILL machine, in the
Packaging Room of the Chipman chemical plant.

7 It was not a fire with flames, but
8 what we would rather call a "heat generated chemical
9 breakdown" or a "decomposition". A product known
10 as APM 50W, an insecticide, containing 50 percent
11 azinphos methyl powder and 50 percent filler, was
12 being processed. The toxicity and the health effects
13 of this -- I believe that Doctor Cunningham will
be making some remarks about this later.

14 The smoke and the strong smell from
15 this product, which came from the plant, caused the
16 evacuation, as you know, of about a thousand families.

17 Our Branch -- we were notified of
18 the incident through our 24-hour Queen's Park
19 telephone service, the answering service, and we
20 were called by the Stoney Creek Fire Department.
21 As a standard practice, one of our Managers was
contacted and put in touch with the Fire Department.

22 It's not unusual for us to receive
23 calls from the Fire Department, or from the police,
24 or from any other people, for that matter, for
25 accidents or in emergencies like this. They call




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2 us at all times.

3 What the Manager did then -- he
4 contacted one of my Inspectors -- and the Inspector
5 went out, and he was at the premises about 8 o'clock.

6 The Inspector contacted at that time
7 -- he contacted plant and fire officials at the
8 scene, but he was unable to speak to the workers;
9 8 of the 10 workers had been taken to hospital and
10 they were examined and later released. The area
11 had been blocked off by fire officials so we couldn't
12 go into the plant, and the Inspector left the premises
13 about 12:00 midnight.

14 The next morning he returned and
15 he was accompanied by one of our Regional Engineers
16 and a physician from the Occupational Health Branch.
17 All of the 10 workers that had been involved the
18 night before were interviewed in the presence of
19 their Joint Health and Safety Committee
20 representative, and the site was reviewed and
21 photographs were taken.

22 On the following day, January the
23 23rd, the Inspector and the Regional Engineer returned
24 to the plant to continue the investigation, and
25 we observed the dismantling of the ALL-FILL machine.
I have some slides of this machine that you'll be
able to know what I'm talking about in a few minutes,
if you'll just bear with me.



1
2 And the purpose of dismantling the
3 machine was to see if we could find the cause of
4 the fire.

5 Also present during this investigation
6 were representatives from the Ministry of the
7 Environment and a Forensic Mechanical Engineer from
8 the Ministry of the Solicitor General.


9 At the conclusion of the examination
10 the parts of the machine were taken to the Forensic
11 Science Lab for further testing.

12 Since that time there have been eleven
13 visits to the plant by our staff, to the plant and
14 to other agencies, to complete this investigation.
15 And we have made visits as of January 27th right
16 through until March the 20th, to complete this
17 investigation.

18 We now feel that the investigation
19 is complete.

20 Is the unit on there, please?
21 Can you see that at the back? Sorry, it's not very
22 clear.

23 This is where it all came from. This
24 is what they call an ALL-FILL machine. It is a typical
25 blending machine that is used quite widely in industry
for mixing products. It is about the size of a drill
press, about perhaps 7 feet high. This is not the
actual machine, this is just a photograph from a



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catalogue.

The particular machine in the plant was manufactured, I think, in about 1976, and about 3 years ago a modification was ordered for it, for a sleeve inside. Now I'll mention the sleeve a little later on because it plays a very important part in our investigation.

What they do with this -- the product is dropped in, down the black chute you can see at the top -- I think I have a pointer here -- down that chute. The product comes from a hopper up above; goes into this lower stainless steel hopper. There is an agitator inside -- not an agitator -- an auger inside, and the product comes out here into little bags.

At the time they were filling 2-kilogram bags of product with this one.

Could I have the other slide, please?

This is a hopper on the second floor of the building. The two workers were working up here, dumping product into this chute, which goes into a lower hopper. You can see on the sides there are ventilation hoses from that unit. You can also see the blackness here from the fire that resulted afterwards. All of this white product here is what they call "talc". It is not a normal condition, that's just talc that they dumped in to try and



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prevent the fire.

The two workers working in this area would be -- under normal circumstances they're protected with eye protection, usually goggles. They wear cover-alls and they wear respirators, they wear rubber gloves and they wear rubber boots. They also have lockers and shower rooms to take all contaminated clothing off.

Could you move on, please?

This is the hopper down below, where they feed into that hopper. This is the lower, larger hopper where the product goes in. I don't think I need to say much more about that.

Thank you. Next one, please?


This is the actual mixing machine where the fire started. This is a ventilation shaft, and across here, where the worker would work, around here, and this ventilation would draw any excess product away from the breathing zone of the worker.

This is a stainless steel hopper and that's the drive mechanism up at the top.

Next slide, please?

Again, this is the same machine from a different angle. This is an automatic weigh scale over here, I believe. And, again, the ventilation pipes in the area.

The next one, please?




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2 This is a schematic drawing of what
3 the inside of that 'silver' hopper looks like. This
4 is the rotating auger in the middle, and this is
5 a sweep arm that goes around and around in this,
6 as the product comes in, and flows through into
7 the bags. There are two speeds to this auger. One
8 is about 1,700 revs. That's about twice the speed
9 your car engine would be running if it was idling.
10 It's about 1,700 revs to fill the product bags.

11 The sleeve I mentioned earlier, that
12 was put on this piece of equipment, is that little
13 sleeve up there. The purpose of that sleeve was
14 to keep the dust and the product from going up inside
15 the workings of the equipment.

16 This sleeve had been put on quite
17 a while ago. There were supposed to be four bolts
18 retaining it to the top of the machine. When it
19 was dismantled there were only three bolts in it.
20 It was badly damaged. A bolt was missing and it
21 was cracked and showed signs of repair. There was
22 quite a gap between the aluminum sleeve and the
23 shaft itself, and the two felt washers that supposedly
24 were to keep the product from going up inside to
25 the workings was indeed all worn away and burned
away.

What we know that happened was that
the product came into the whole unit during the




1
2 filling operation, and as time went on it filled
3 this cavity, and it just crammed up in the cavity
4 and the sleeve did what it was not supposed to do,
5 and it allowed the dust to come up inside.

6 That stub that is there -- of course,
7 this shaft rotates, and the top of the stub had
8 worn flat, and, because that was all jammed with
9 product, created a lot of heat as it went around.

10 This product that they were processing
11 has a rather peculiar item to it: it is that at
12 over 85 degrees Celsius it will start to decompose,
13 which means, start to burn. It burns on its own.
14 I'm not a chemist, but I am told that once it starts
15 smouldering, it will just keep smouldering on its
16 own. It doesn't need a lot of oxygen or whatever.
17 And this is where the bad maintenance on here
18 -- this has not been repaired -- the product got
19 up inside here, and this rotating shaft and the
20 head created friction, and it was the friction heat
21 that caused the smouldering fire.

22 All of the product in here burned.
23 No one was aware that it was burning until one of
24 the workers saw some smoke coming out the top. They
25 touched the siding and found it was extremely hot.
By this time the heat and the smouldering fire had
gone up into the large bunker, up at the top.

The workers tried to extinguish the



1
2 fire from the outside by cooling this outer jacket
3 with fire extinguishers. That didn't work. They
4 also went upstairs -- and if you remember all the
5 white talc that was around -- that was where they
6 had dumped talc in, which is an inert filler, to
7 try and smother the flames. That didn't work, and
8 consequently what happened, all of the product in
9 here decomposed, and so did all the product, about
10 600 kilograms, I believe. And that was the product
11 that gave you this very rotten smell, that all went
12 outside.

13 Immediately they found there was
14 a fire the workers shut it off and they started
15 doing some work with the -- they put air-supplied
16 masks on and all those kinds of things.

17 Can I have the next slide, please?


18 This is the shaft and the sleeve
19 that was put on specifically to keep the dust and
20 product from going out into the workings, but indeed
21 what it did -- all of this is hard build-up of the
22 decomposed chemical, and you can see it's all badly
23 damaged and burned.

24 The next one, please?

25 That is the auger from inside, that
measured the product out.

Thank you.

This is the machine afterwards, of



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course. You can see the extent of the heat from around here. This is where the sleeve was attached to supposedly the four bolts.

And is that all the slides now?


Could we have the lights back on, please?

As I say, our investigation took quite a considerable time, a number of visits, and we have concluded from our investigation that the cause of the incident was frictional heat build-up in the rotating shaft located in the dust sleeve, and this frictional heat build-up caused decomposition of the APM 50W product being packed.

Our investigation has concluded that had proper maintenance of the equipment been carried out, and had the workers been properly advised of the reactive nature of the product, that it is likely that this incident would not have happened.

Orders have been issued to the employer regarding proper maintenance and training of the workers when handling reactive products.

An order has also been issued for submission of equipment plans, for review by Ministry of Labour Engineer, and a "Stop Work" order has also been issued on the process -- that the process would cease and not start again until the plans and the training had been reviewed.



1
2 And as Mr. Wrye said, matters of charges
3 are presently under intensive review.

4 And the action planned, over and
5 above what we've already done -- in addition we
6 have two Chemical Engineers, one from the Occupational
7 Health Branch and one from the Industrial Health
8 and Safety Branch, and they are conducting a
9 preliminary audit into the compatibility of chemicals,
10 manufacturing processes and machinery used in the
11 operations, and they will ascertain whether potential
12 hazards exist to the degree that a full-scale Hazard
13 Operability Review should be undertaken.

14 In addition to that, a Hazard Bulletin
15 is being produced to alert companies who handle
16 a similar product to APM 50W or other reactive
17 products, and we will also continue our cyclical
18 audits of Chipman.

19 And that's the end of my presentation.
20 Thank you.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: I will call now
22 on Mr. Jack King, President of Chipman.

23 MR. JACK KING: Thank you very
24 much, Mr. Chairman.

25 What I would like to cover this evening
-- it's sort of a very brief presentation -- are
the main points that were in the report that was
issued by Chipman last week. But first of all I




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2 would like to say a little bit about Chipman and
3 its operation.

4 Chipman is in the business of blending
5 and packaging crop protection chemicals for use
6 in crops and forestry across Canada. It does not
7 manufacture chemicals, but simply blends together
8 and packages ingredients in a form that allows the
9 growers to apply the product to a crop.

10 Chipman's Head Office, as well as
11 its plant, is located in Stoney Creek, and 130 of
12 the 235 employees are located here. Most live in
13 Stoney Creek or the immediate area, so we have many
14 strong reasons for our deep commitment to the
15 community. The fact that we made the report of the
16 internal investigation underlines the feeling of
17 responsibility to the community.

18 We are very proud of our safety record.
19 We have not had a lost time disabling injury at
20 our Stoney Creek plant, or the previous Hamilton
21 facility, for 31 years. Our disability record is
22 excellent. We do not have anyone receiving
23 disability payments because of occupational health
24 concerns, and we believe we are operating safely.

25 However, in light of recent incidents
and our subsequent investigation we have now made
a very strong commitment to further improve the
safety of our operations. We are very concerned



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
about the three problems we have had this past year.

Following the incidents last spring we took some very incisive actions. We initiated a Hazard and Operability Study of the entire plant, which takes an in-depth look at the critical operations on a product by product basis. We conducted a Safety Audit of the plant. We developed an Operating Procedure Manual and started implementing new employee training procedures. We posted an Emergency Communication list at each telephone station in the plant.

So obviously, because of these actions that we had taken, we were very disappointed when we had our problem on January 21st. The full-scale investigation initiated immediately after the incident revealed two general areas that require strengthening; the first being that of maintenance, the second being the training of employees.

Turning to the maintenance, we did have programs in place, but we had not developed a "fail-proof" recording, scheduling and controlling procedure. That is our top priority need in the action plan.

A new Preventative Maintenance Program has been introduced for the filling equipment, and this will be expanded to cover all of the critical plant equipment, and a recording and control procedure



1
2 is a very vital part of this program.

3 In regard to training, we did review
4 and upgrade our training, both in operations and
5 in emergency response actions, after the 1985
6 incidents, but we now know we must do even more.
7 We are still maintaining our commitment that we
8 would not start the powder packaging plant until
9 we are confident it can be operated safely and
without incident.

10 Some of the other actions, we have
11 already taken.

12 We implemented a program to thoroughly
13 review the operating procedures the day after
14 the incident, and this has included discussions
with other crop protection chemical blenders.

15 Some new procedures have been
16 introduced, on a product by product basis, which
17 cover the operations as well as the emergency
18 response.

19 Material safety data sheets for
20 each product are being reviewed on a product by
21 product basis, and the blending and operating
22 procedures for use in the plant are being developed
from these material safety data sheets.

23 A paging system to support emergency
24 response programs has been introduced, as well
25 as two-way radios for faster communications within



1
2 the plant.

3 We have redesigned the packaging
4 equipment and are modifying the bearing dust
5 protectors, and installing heat-sensing equipment.

6 We are improving the stack monitoring
7 system and adding water deluge equipment.

8 We have advised the City of Stoney
9 Creek officials that we would like to be part
10 of a community-based emergency response plan,
11 and we have offered to assist wherever possible.

12 City and other interested community
13 leaders have also toured and inspected the works.


14 These are the major action plans,
15 and we hope this summary, as well as the answers
16 to any questions which may be posed later in the
17 program, will show that we are taking this incident
18 very seriously, and that we too wish to continue
19 to reside and to work in a safe community.

20 Thank you very much, Mr.Chairman.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Our next speaker
22 is Mr.Ray Plant, who is the Regional Solicitor
23 for the Region of Hamilton-Wentworth.

24 MR.RAY PLANT: My purpose here
25 this evening is to outline briefly to you the
Regional response to the incident at Chipman on
January 21st.

It took place in the evening, and




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2 it first came to the attention of the political
3 people responsible to respond to the incident.

4 There was a council meeting going on at the time,
5 and needless to say, as the word spread, the
6 council meeting equally sped to a conclusion!

7 At that time the Regional Chairman,
8 together with the Mayor of the City and the Mayor
9 of Stoney Creek, sped to the location of the site.
10 Outside the Chipman gates there was a mobile command
11 post set up, and the emergency control team, which
12 is provided for under the Regional by-law, consisting
13 of the Regional Co-ordinator as the Chairman of
14 the Group, the Regional Police Chief, the Regional
15 Fire Co-ordinator -- who is also the Fire Chief
16 for the City of Hamilton; the Medical Officer
17 of Health, the Commissioner of Social Services,
18 and the Commissioner of Engineering for the Region,
19 were all present.

20 The Chairman of the Region consulted
21 with these officials as to the nature of the incident
22 and the possibility of it spreading, the possibility
23 of it being more serious than was apparent. He
24 was assured, both by the technical people present
25 and the members of this control team, that the
level of activity of the incident was sufficiently
low that there need not be a declaration of emergency
under the Regional by-law.




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2 The Regional by-law provides for
3 an emergency to be declared by the Regional Chairman
4 so that Regional forces may be committed to a
5 response, and this allows them to become responsible
6 for the operations to control the incident, and
7 to take the necessary steps or expenditures that
8 may be involved.

9 It's important to note at this
10 point that although the Regional forces were there
11 at the site, doing their job -- the Regional Fire
12 Co-ordinator, the Regional Police were there in
13 force -- and there was an evacuation. This was
14 carried out at the senior staff level. And it
15 was for the purpose of, you might say, a very
16 prudent course of action. At that time it was
17 not known the full extent of the nature of the
18 incident.

19 Some one and a half hours later,
20 after some 60 to 70 persons had been relocated
21 during the evacuation to a nearby large restaurant
22 -- the "Chandelier" Restaurant, I believe it was
23 -- the Regional Chairman then declared that the
24 evacuation should be ended and operations resumed
25 to normal.

Now this again was taken in
consultation with the senior officials present.

In my view -- and I was present



1
2 at the incident as well -- the Regional political
3 officials and senior staff present acted prudently
4 under the by-law and with a great sense of
5 responsibility, and although the incident at first
6 was not fully appreciated, it became increasingly
7 clear that the incident was not of a sufficient
8 magnitude to declare an emergency; that it was
9 not going to spread to the dimensions that required
10 an overnight evacuation or any danger to the
11 inhabitants in the immediate area.

12 Part of the operation was terminated
13 at that point, the evacuation. There was a City
14 of Stoney Creek fire truck there overnight, again
15 as a prudent measure. The Regional forces were
16 again called back and people allowed to return
17 to their homes.

18 If there are more particular questions
19 later, during the question period, these will
20 be dealt with at that time.

21 Thank you.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
23 much, Mr.Plant. I will call now on Doctor Ian
24 Cunningham, our Medical Officer of Health.

25 DOCTOR IAN CUNNINGHAM: Mr.Chairman,
Mr.Ministers, Ladies and Gentlemen, I've been
looking forward to this opportunity to discuss
the fire at Chipman's, because I know there are



1
2 many people who have been anxious about what happened,
3 and what I would like to do tonight is to deal
4 with what I know and what I have been told about
5 the toxicity of Azinphosmethyl, and with your
6 permission I'd like to just refer to it as "APM";
7 and probably much importantly, its many, many
8 breakdown products.

9 And then, because there are questions
10 about what actually happened that night, I'd like
11 to touch on my personal activities and how that
12 worked out on that night.

13 Now the designated chemical here
14 is azinphosmethyl. My difficulty with this paper
15 is that I'd like to speak to you in English, and
16 the more I get into the toxicity of this chemical,
17 the less I would be understood by somebody who
18 had merely taken an English degree, because the
19 chemical things weigh up more and more. I'll try
20 and be as 'non-jargon' as possible.

21 This chemical is an insecticide,
22 and it comes from a family that's well-known to
23 the medical profession, parathion.
24 That, in the literature, is one of its cousins.
25 They're both quite toxic.

APM itself -- the literature reports
that seven drops to a teaspoonful for a 150 pound
man, by mouth, is enough to be fatal. But it works




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2 in a particular way, and I think it's important
3 to identify here that the actions that are reported
4 for this drug were not reported by the people
5 who attended the hospitals or the physicians,
6 and the symptomatology, the spread of symptoms:
7 sweating, disturbances of vision, vomiting, diarrhea,
8 shortness of breath, abdominal cramps, changes
9 in the appearance of the eye, and a lot of other
10 symptoms -- these can be relatively quickly corrected
11 by large doses of atropine.

12 Incidentally, there's a blood test,
13 too, that can be done, and that was done by physicians
14 at the Joseph Brant Hospital, and the blood tests
15 were negative, suggesting that the exposure to
16 APM, especially among the workers whom you would
17 think would have had the greatest exposure of
18 all the citizens involved -- the workers would
19 have had the most -- they didn't show any signs
20 of that.

21 So I think what we're looking at
22 is an exposure to the break-down products.

23 Now what I have to tell you there
24 is that they are irritating, and there are many
25 of them. I have a list of eighteen. I hope some
of you have the publication that Chipman put out.
In the appendix they list all the break-down products.
I gather it breaks down at 200 degrees Centigrade



1
2 and you end up with a whole slew -- a real 'soup'
3 of chemicals that are extremely odorous.

4 In fact, I live up on the East
5 Mountain, and at about 9:30 my family could smell
6 it on the East Mountain, and that, as 'the crow
7 flies', would be seven miles, I would think.

8 The importance, however, of the
9 smell is that your nose picks it up in parts per
10 billion. Parts per billion -- I think that's one
11 second in thirty years, thirty-two years -- that's
12 very, very dilute. All the toxicities, though,
13 are measured in one thousandths of that, parts
14 per million, and that level had not been perceived.

15 The exposure for man -- a working
16 man or working person -- in an 8-hour period,
17 is 0.2 milligrams per cubic metre, and I understand
18 that means 0.2 parts per million, a very difficult
19 thing to conceive, it's 0.2 milligrams.

20 The little Valium pills, the blue
21 ones, are 5 milligrams, and if you just divide
22 that by about 40, you'll be getting at the level
23 of the kind of exposure that's acceptable or maximal
24 for industrial exposure.

25 The chemicals that have been listed
-- list of them, the inventory of them -- they're
from the break-down products, they smell even
worse than the original, which is characterized




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2 as rotten cabbage.

3 Now, the problem as your Health
4 Officer -- and I've worked for you since '68 --
5 is to decide whether there is any impact on people
6 who aren't working, people with asthma, people
7 with allergies, people with bad livers, and such
8 like. The literature that's been made available
9 to me by two or three toxicologists indicates
10 that there is no long-term effect. There are some
11 confusing things in the literature that it does
12 to rats. But that's a normal thing in toxicological
13 literature. You'll always find one species that's
14 more sensitive than the other. But the literature
15 about long-term exposure, and exposure of people
16 who are chronically ill -- there is no evidence
17 to support that this would be damaging.

18 I guess then there's the other
19 question about whether this will alter the quality
20 of your family, should you be planning on having
21 a family, the impact on testes or ovaries. Will
22 it damage a baby in utero? Has it got any of these
23 nasty side effects? And, again, the literature
24 comes up blank. Comes up blank on APM.

25 "Not proven" would be more like
it with the soup that comes from the breakdown
of APM.

Now the usual picture with organic




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2 chemicals is that we have hundreds and hundreds
3 of them, of which the long term work-ups are not
4 existent for about 90 of them. So we do come to
5 you in ignorance. We can't say categorically that
6 they don't. But we do know that there's no respectable
7 literature that would justify a concern at this
8 point.

9 I know too that some scientists
10 take opposing views and will bring you papers,
11 but on balance they don't gather much support
12 in the various areas where I seek supportive evidence.

13 What I think happened was: there
14 was a lot of heat generated, the APM broke down.
15 A great amount of a chemical 'soup' came out.
16 The people who reported to the hospital felt
17 nauseated; some of them had eye irritation. The
18 blood tests that were done showed no signs of
19 APM at work. And that all kind of makes sense,
20 as I see the matter reconstructed.

21 Now if you'll bear with me I'd
22 like to tell you what I did that night, because
23 there has been some question about the judgment
24 calls. And I must remind you that I'm a Health
25 Officer, I'm a physician, and I work from clinical
observations, so that my data -- well, it's first-hand
but it's simple.

It was 9:05 on the 21st of January.




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2 I was called out of Regional Council to address
3 the problem of a spill of APM, and I was lucky
4 in finding a senior man at the Regional Laboratory,
5 and he read off to me the toxicology of this chemical
6 as we then knew it.

7 I told Mr. Armstrong at the time
8 that we should approach the plant with great caution,
9 because of its toxicity.

10 After some discussion Mr. Carson,
11 the Regional Social Services Commissioner, and
12 Mr. Armstrong and I, decided that we would go out
13 to the plant, and my understanding as I left City
14 Hall was that we go for Mohawk College, Stoney
15 Creek campus.

16 Well, I arrived there, and there
17 were two rather bored policemen who didn't quite
18 know why they were there, and that's all that
19 was there, and they said: "Oh, they moved it all
20 out to the plant". That kind of encouraged me.
21 But I noticed as I went through Stoney Creek that
22 the smell was getting worse and worse, but the
23 young policemen on point duty were quite healthy,
24 and if they had been standing in a toxic gas,
25 as I was expecting, I would have expected they
would have been ill. It acts quickly and it acts
with severity, but at these dilutions there was
no sign of that.



1
2 And, indeed, when I got to the
3 plant, people were standing around, joking. Now
4 this was about 10 o'clock I arrived out at the
5 plant. And I noted, too, there were two houses
6 west of the plant, that obviously had had maximum
7 exposure, and nothing was happening.

8 So from these rather simple clinical
9 observations I moved very quickly to expert advice.
10 I had the great good luck of having a 'phone
11 call at 10 after 10:00 from Doctor Elizabeth Kaegi,
12 who is the physician for CIL. I know Elizabeth
13 from her post-grad studies in McMaster, and through
14 social contact. I have a great respect for her
15 learning and her integrity. And after discussion
16 with her about the toxicity and the kind of accident
17 we were looking at, I felt that the exposure probably
18 had been minimal.

19 So let me summarize. The fire had
20 been over three and a half hours by the time I
21 carried out my assessment. There was a 15 kilometre
22 per hour wind coming out of the east-south-east,
23 and that was actively carrying the material and
24 diluting it. There were no signs of toxicity in
25 the neighbourhood and people standing in the streets.
And Doctor Kaegi's report further strengthened
what was really a field inspection observation
-- that there had been little reason to be concerned



1
2 about that, and indeed the plant staff had been
3 around the plant, looking for these materials.

4 They did find the 'soup' -- let
5 me use that phrase -- the stuff that irritates
6 eyes and will make you sick. They did find that,
7 but they didn't find APM as such.

8 So, by that time, 10 after 10:00, .
9 10:15, it was quite obvious that whatever had
10 taken place, had taken place, and there was no
11 reason to pursue any further action, and I advised
12 the Chairman similarly.

13 I appreciate the opportunity of
14 discussing this, and later answering any questions.

15 Thank you.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Doctor
17 Cunningham.


18 As Doctor Cunningham has noted,
19 you will have the opportunity of asking questions
20 of him after the break.

21 The last presentation before the
22 break is from Mr.Boris Boyko, who is the Regional
23 Director, Ministry of the Environment.

24 Mr.Boyko?

25 MR.BORIS BOYKO: Thank you,
Mr.Chairman. Good evening, Ladies and Gentlemen.

While the first overhead is being
put on, I would like to take a few minutes to




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2 comment on the Ministry of the Environment's role
3 in such situations, before we get into detail
4 as to what happened on the night of the 21st and
5 events that have followed that.

6 Some of you may have picked up
7 from the table at the back a number of stapled
8 sheets. It's Ministry Policy No.13-01-01, which
9 deals with the Ministry's role in emergencies
10 and spills. For those of you who did not pick
11 them up, I think there are a number of copies
12 left, and you may want to have a look at it.

13 As the overhead shows, the Ministry's
14 prime role in emergencies is to provide advice
15 and support to the agency in charge. The Ministry
16 of the Environment is not the agency in charge,
17 but our role is to support that particular body.
18 We are responsible for ensuring that appropriate
19 monitoring is carried out; providing data and
20 other information to the Medical Officer of Health;
21 administering our own legislation that we may
22 be required to act upon: the Environmental Protection
23 Act, the Pesticides Act, the Ontario Water Resources
24 Act.

25 We have to notify other agencies
if they are not already involved. We have to ensure
that adequate clean-up and disposal takes place.


If the incident is a spill, we're



1
2 responsible for informing the media and the public,
3 and we also are required to document all findings.

4 With respect to the Chipman incident,
5 January 21st, there were a number of Ministry
6 problems, as the Minister of the Environment referred
7 to. Probably the one that sticks out most prominently
8 is the prolonged response time from the time of
9 the incident, or when the incident was first reported
10 to the Fire Department, and the time Ministry
11 staff appeared on the scene. There were a number
12 of reasons for this, I'd just like to go over
13 them, not as an excuse, but identifying problems
14 and what we have done about these.

15 The first one: the Ministry Spills
16 Action Centre has a toll-free number,
17 (1) 800-268-6060. According to Bell Telephone
18 something called a "ring jumper cable" was broken
19 on that particular line. What that meant was that
20 anyone calling in heard the line ringing, but
21 the people at the Action Centre didn't hear anything.
22 That also had the effect of tying up that first
23 line and allowing subsequent calls to 'flop over'
24 onto the other two remaining lines. This explains
25 why the Fire Department called the Ministry on
three occasions, and I believe -- the numbers
could be corrected -- but I believe the first
time they let the 'phone ring 50 times, then 27




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2 times and 19 times, and no one heard it ringing.
3 But this same action allowed subsequent calls
4 to be 'flopped over' and be directed to the other
5 two lines, which could then be answered. It also
6 created a lot of problems with respect to the
7 volume of traffic on the two remaining lines.

8 The SAP system was relatively new.
9 It was only introduced to West Central Region
10 on January the 6th, a couple of weeks before the
11 incident. The field response, the response of
12 field staff, was contingent upon the availability
13 of Ministry staff to go. In some cases -- one
14 person's home was without heat, because he was
15 working on his furnace; in another case a person
16 was baby-sitting, he had no one to leave his children
17 with -- but it was contingent upon the availability
18 of staff.

19 With respect to the TAGA
20 system, the mobile van, emergency van, for analyzing
21 ambient air quality -- as the Minister indicated,
22 this van was out of service. A compressor was
23 out for repair -- something that happens relatively
24 infrequently -- but the equipment was not available
25 that night.

So what has happened? Some of the
solutions with respect to the Spills Action Centre
-- they are now checking all the lines on a daily



1
2 basis at the start of operations. When overload
3 situations arise with respect to the 'phone system,
4 I believe the equipment is in place, or has been
5 ordered, to provide a message, allowing callers,
6 if all lines are busy, to leave a recorded message.

7 Also, the staff serving this centre
8 have been increased, and provisions have been
9 made to bring in staff on an emergency basis,
10 allowing access to other support staff and supervisory
11 staff to come in when required.

12 With respect to the field response
13 -- provision for 24-hour Ministry field staff
14 response is being made available through providing
15 for stand-by staff, staff who are on call to respond
16 to such situations.

17 On the question of monitoring --
18 the Minister also spoke to the use of a portable
19 analyzer. Doctor David Balsillie of our
20 Air Resources Branch is here, and if anyone has
21 any questions he could speak in great depth to
22 the technical details of the analyzer; but let
23 me say it is a portable analyzer, it weighs about
24 30, 40 pounds, based on the infra-red analysis
25 principle. It does not need extensive set-up;
it can be operated without someone with a lot
of sophisticated training. It's a direct-reading
machine; the person carrying it can get a result




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2 right on the spot, and it will analyze over 120
3 compounds, I believe. It will not analyze for
4 everything 'under the sun', but it will analyze
5 for about 120 compounds.

6 What has the Ministry done with
7 respect to this incident? The Investigations and
8 Enforcement Branch conducted their own investigation.
9 The Abatement staff of West Central Region formed
10 a working group, consisting of our Regional Pesticides
11 Officer, John Percy, Environmental Officer, Randy
12 Wenzel, and Area Supervisor, Dave Matchett. This
13 team went through the Chipman operation, all aspects
14 of the Chipman operation, and carried out an extensive
15 survey I'll be speaking to on the next overhead.

16 Our Laboratory Services Branch
17 carried out analysis on combustion products of
18 the pesticide, and this information, along with
19 modelling carried out by the Air Resources Branch
20 was forwarded to the Medical Officer of Health.

21 All of these efforts also involved
22 extensive liaison with the Ministry of Labour,
23 Ministry of Health, and the Stoney Creek Fire
24 Department.

25 The results of some of this work?
Some of you may be aware that a charge was laid
under section 13 of the Environmental Protection
Act, I believe it was laid last Friday, with respect



1
2 to loss of enjoyment of normal use of property.

3 The Ministry working group that
4 I spoke of, the three-man working group, looked
5 at a number of different areas: complete review
6 of materials handling and operations within the
7 company, and identified some shortcomings: the
8 need for alarms, additional alarms and
9 instrumentation. And some of the findings of this
10 working group were also the findings of the
11 independent study carried out by the company.

12 And again, I don't think anyone
13 has mentioned, but there were a number of reports
14 on the back table with a red binding, that are
15 the report prepared by the company on this incident.

16 The alarms and instrument was addressed
17 in Recommendation 1) of the company's report as
18 well. We have found there's a need to interlock
19 some of the pollution control equipment in the
20 event of abnormalities within the plant, so that
21 the pollution control equipment doesn't compound
22 on an existing problem.

23 There's a greater need for monitoring
24 and recording, and a lack of adequate operating
25 and maintenance procedures. These, again, are
somewhat similar to some of the findings of the
company.

What is happening from here? The



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charge will proceed in its normal legal manner.


With respect to the working team's survey and a report that will stem from that survey, our findings will be reviewed with other agencies. We will also be discussing these findings with Chipman, and we will also be incorporating and addressing the concerns addressed through public submissions this evening.

In addition, the Chairman will be making this comment again at the end, but there will be a 30-day period following this meeting for written submissions, both to this Ministry, the Ministry of the Environment, and the Ministry of Labour. All of these will be taken into account, and we will be preparing a draft control order, likely around the end of May, given the 30-day submission response time. This draft control order for further action required by the company will be discussed in detail at a second public meeting. Probably that public meeting will take place in June, and then following that there will be again a 30-day submission period, with a control order likely being issued around August.

Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Boyko.

As I mentioned earlier, there will




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2 an opportunity for you after the break to address
3 questions directly to Mr. Ray Plant, to Mr. Jack
4 King, and to Doctor Ian Cunningham. In addition
5 to those gentlemen there will also be Mr. Brian
6 Goodman, Executive Director of the Occupational
7 Health and Safety Branch of the Ministry of Labour;
8 Mr. Dennis Caplice, Assistant Deputy Minister of
9 the Ministry of the Environment; Mr. Stan Napper,
10 who is, as you all know, the Mayor of Stoney Creek,
11 and also Mr. Ken Reeves, who is the Co-ordinator
12 of Emergency Planning for the Ministry of the
13 Solicitor General. They will be here, as a panel,
14 to answer your questions.

15 The two Ministers, Mr. Bradley and
16 Mr. Wrye, will still be here after the break.

17 And, in addition to that, these
18 people all have resource staff here to answer
19 questions that perhaps go even beyond the depth
20 of their individual knowledge of this incident.

21 I must say that you've been an
22 excellent 'class'. I've never had a group that
23 would sit for more than an hour without shuffling
24 papers and making for the door, muttering things
25 about "coffee"!

26 You'll also be pleased to know
27 that we've actually caught up a little bit on
28 our schedule. We started a few minutes late and



1
2 we're just a few minutes less than that late right
3 now. But let me remind you that in calling now
4 for a 15-minute break, to indicate that after
5 break this will be your time; the time when the
6 microphones will be open, and we will invite you
7 to come forward and make your statements, express
8 your concerns, and to ask your questions.


9 I have already had indications
10 from three groups of people that they would like
11 to be recognized. If there are any others in the
12 audience who would like to indicate to me that
13 you would like to make a statement, then I would
14 be happy to add your name to that list. And if,
15 during the course of the evening, you feel that,
16 after all, you would like to say something, then
17 when we have gone through those people who have
18 already been identified by that time, the microphones
19 will be open and we can recognize questions from
20 the floor.

21 Thank you very much. We'll re-convene
22 in 15 minutes.

23 --- (THE HEARING ADJOURNED FROM 9:00 TO 9:25 P.M.)

24 --- (UPON RESUMING:)

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and
Gentlemen, if I could call the second part of
the meeting to order.



1
2 I would mention, first of all,
3 that I have been very successful in my quest
4 for speakers. I'd like to tell you I have 15
5 people who have indicated that they would like
6 to ask questions or to make comments at this
7 time.


8 One of the things that will be
9 done is to, of course, take a very careful record
10 of the comments in this part of the meeting,
11 and so it would be much appreciated if those
12 of you who do address the meeting would identify
13 yourselves with your name; where you're coming
14 from in a geographical sense, which Municipality
15 you live in. Also where you're coming from in
16 the sense that I recognize that some people are
17 speaking on behalf of larger groups, such as
18 our first speaker.

19 The Chair will first recognize
20 Doug Pendlebury, who is the Chairman of CHAP.

21 MR.DOUG PENDLEBURY: Thank
22 you, Mr.Chairman.

23 My name is Doug Pendlebury and
24 I was elected on March 6th, 1986, by the residents
25 of Stoney Creek as a Chairman of the CHAP
organization.

CHAP -- the Concerned Homeowners
Against Pollution is comprised of a non-partisan



1
2 group of residents, who want to protect and enhance
3 the quality of our environment.

4 As a result of the Chipman incidents
5 and the perceived failure of Municipal and Regional
6 Governments to act, we have come together to
7 seek resolutions to some of our concerns.


8 Despite the undeserved reputation,
9 we are not reacting as individuals but rather
10 are a group of concerned citizens elected by
11 a community.

12 This evening we plan to pose some
13 questions and, as well, will present a number
14 of constructive requests, designed to enhance
15 our neighbourhood, including industry and residents.
16 We feel that it is essential that our concerns
17 are addressed with respect to our ability to
18 live and work in this area with a feeling of
19 security, health and wellbeing.

20 We are also very concerned as
21 to the effects that present and future
22 industrialization are having on our property
23 values.

24 At this point I would like to
25 outline six specific concerns we feel are very
important and must be addressed tonight.

Firstly: we request a comprehensive
report from the City of Stoney Creek as to their




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2 program guidelines to attract non-polluting industry
3 to our City, and their current standards for
4 potential newcomers.

5 Secondly: we advocate that a truly
6 independent investigation, funded by municipal
7 and/or other levels of government, be initiated,
8 to confirm and report on the Chipman incident.
9 Having studied the Chipman Report relating to
10 the APM 50W decomposition on January 21st, 1986,
11 it is felt that the apparent lack of preparedness
12 for such an event by a company, after more than
13 12 years of operation, further reinforces the
14 need for an independent investigation.

15 We suggest that such a panel could
16 involve the Industrial Accident Prevention
17 Association, the Ministry of Labour, and/or the
18 Ministry of the Environment.

19 Third: we feel that the evacuation
20 in January, 1986, was not handled in a suitable
21 manner. As such we advise that the City of Stoney
22 Creek enact a comprehensive evacuation procedure.
23 We request to be informed as to the procedures
24 and mechanisms with reference to communication
25 with the public; special provisions for the
handicapped and children in school, and for people
with existing health problems.

Four: we are also concerned with



1
2 current and potential health effects of the chemical
3 pollutants and decomposition products produced
4 in our community. We request the establishment
5 of ongoing health studies to establish baselines
6 and long term health effects, initiated by the
7 Ministry of Health, on people who live in this
8 area.

9 We request that the City of Stoney
10 Creek establish records for the knowledge of
11 the public and agencies such as hospitals and
12 fire department, of a complete and regularly
13 updated inventory of potentially dangerous materials
14 handled and produced by local industries.

15 Six: we request that the Ministry
16 of the Environment have available sensitive
17 monitoring equipment to monitor and record levels
18 of environmental pollutants in our area.

19 In conclusion, we advocate that
20 legislation and substantial penalties, both
21 to industry and to management, as individuals,
22 be implemented by our Provincial Government,
23 to effectively restrain the potential polluters.

24 We, the voting public, are prepared
25 to share these concerns, as necessary, with the
Ministry of the Environment.

Thank you very much.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very



1
2 much, Mr. Pendlebury.

3 We have the Ministry of the
4 Environment here, who I'll call on in a moment
5 to respond, and secondly to identify some issues
6 that relate to the City of Stoney Creek, and
7 we will call on the Mayor, Mayor Stan Napper,
8 in a moment, to comment on those issues.


9 Firstly, the Minister of the
10 Environment, Mr. Bradley, next.

11 THE HONOURABLE MR. JIM BRADLEY:
12 First of all, Doug, please give me a copy of
13 your brief, will you? I'd like to have that in
14 hand.

15 You mentioned a number of issues
16 that emerged that may want repeating.

17 One of the, I think, good results
18 of this is we've been able to find these infra-red
19 analyzers, that we think will be an important
20 new development in being to deal with...


21 One of the problems was the --
22 the TAGA unit, as you know, is simply not
23 a unit that responds in emergency circumstances.
24 It's one that's often used to analyze air in
25 a neighbourhood over a period of time. It was
used in Mississauga because, of course, it was
an ongoing situation in Mississauga, as you will
recall.



1
2 It has to be calibrated as well
3 for specific substances, whereas the new equipment
4 we have will be pre-calibrated to deal with about
5 100 organic substances. So we think that equipment
6 will be helpful.

7 Now we've bought eight of those
8 units. One of them will be here in Hamilton.
9 But they're also easy to transport. Obviously
10 you can't have one in every community, but they're
11 easier to transport. We don't need a 'flying
12 boxcar' to fly them around the Province, so there
13 is an easier ability to make them mobile in other
14 areas.

15 Secondly, I think you alluded
16 to a fact that's been of great concern to me
17 since I've become the Minister, and we're addressing
18 this now, and that is the provision for more
19 meaningful penalties when there are violations
20 of environmental laws in the Province. My view
21 is that the present level of fines that are
22 available, and the lack of provision in certain
23 very flagrant circumstances -- and I'm not suggesting
24 this was one -- but very flagrant circumstances,
25 for jailing penalties, for instance; and some
innovative ways of dealing with those 'ill gotten
gains' from deliberate and ongoing attempts to
contravene the environmental laws of the Province.



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2 I think also your suggestion that
3 we have a better liaison between local citizens
4 in the community itself, and between the Ministry
5 of the Environment, for instance, is a good one.


6 I think your suggestions are good.
7 We appreciate them very much. Perhaps some of
8 the people who are the experts in these matters
9 will comment on some of your specific questions,
10 or some of your specific suggestions.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
12 much, Mr. Bradley.

13 Is there anyone on the panel who
14 would like to comment more specifically on those
15 issues before we move on to the second brief
16 of issues?

17 MR. DENNIS CAPLICE: Yes, I'll
18 cover one point. I'm Dennis Caplice, the Assistant
19 Deputy Minister of Operations with the Ministry
20 of the Environment.

21 I think the seventh point in the
22 first speaker's submission -- Mr. Minister, you
23 did deal with legislation and the penalties under
24 that legislation, and I think you have publicly
25 made yourself quite well known, I think, that
it is your intention, and the Government's intention,
to put an improved package of legislation in
the next Session of the House, particularly as




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2 it relates to the Environmental Protection Act
3 and the fines thereunder. So that aspect is also
4 being addressed. The Bill has not been introduced
5 in the House as yet, but the process of having
6 that is well under way, in the Ministry
7 of the Environment.

8 MR. JIM BRADLEY: The House
9 will resume its Session on April 22nd, with an
10 outline of Government policy. Subsequent to that
11 bills will be introduced. It's my intention to
12 introduce this legislation that we've been working
13 on for some time, so we can provide what I call
14 more "meaningful" and up-to-date penalties for
15 environmental violations.

16 THE HONOURABLE MR. WILLIAM WRYE:
17 Perhaps I should just add a couple of notes.
18 The consideration of the Government in terms
19 of additional environmental penalties extends
20 to penalties for violations of the work place
21 environment as well. We intend to some time,
22 I believe -- I expect it will be late in the
23 Spring Session or early in the Fall -- to be
24 introducing a package of amendments to the
25 Occupational Health and Safety Act. That's an
area we're looking at -- as my colleague has,
as well.

Again, I share my colleagues view
that the penalties in certain instances are just



1
2 not sufficient.

3 Let me just, as well, mention
4 if I might, Mr. Chairman, that I'm certainly willing
5 to share with your group, if you like, copies
6 of Bill 101, which is our new legislation that
7 was introduced in late January this year, if
8 I'm not mistaken.

9 And, I think, But I believe point 5 of your
10 submission: asking for records of inventory from
11 industries within Stoney Creek, will certainly
12 be captured, in a way that I think you would find
13 more than sufficient, by the community "right
14 to know" aspect of the "right to know" legislation.

15 That legislation is and has been
16 introduced, as I said. It is remaining on the
17 Order Paper as we await the introduction of national
18 legislation, which I'm now told by my Federal
19 colleague will be in either June of this year
20 or September, but it's some work that we have
21 counterparts in national legislation, and I think
22 it's important that Ontario make sure that its
23 legislation will dovetail properly with legislation
24 throughout the rest of the country. But we certainly
25 share your view, and that's in our legislation.

In the short term there is no
legislative mandate which will force companies
to collect these inventories and turn them over




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2 to those groups which we've identified that they
3 should be turned over to, and made available
4 on your request to you. This is one of the concerns
5 I have had. I share your view, and that's why
6 I'm introducing the Bill, and within, I think,
7 about 10 days after introducing the Bill -- that's
8 why I had a meeting with my Federal colleague.
9 And, I think, as some of the people in this room
10 know, or have heard, quite publicly and openly,
11 I want to get on with the job of having this
12 national legislation. But it's very important
13 that we move with care, it's very important to
14 industry. I guess it's fair to say we can't have
15 legislation that's 'all over the map' from one
16 province to another. It would lead to nothing
17 but great expense and absolute confusion.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
17 much, Bill. Let's now ask the Mayor, Stan Napper,
18 to comment on Stoney Creek's...

19 MAYOR STAN NAPPER: Thank you,
20 Mr. Chairman. I'm not sure, Doug, that I got all
21 your points. I made a list of a number of them
22 here, so if I don't cover them all, please correct
23 me.

23 First of all I think you were
24 concerned about zoning and what controls do we
25 have as far as any other similar industries




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2 coming in. We can control that with zoning.

3 Hindsight, of course, is always
4 20/20. I'm sure that when the Council of Saltfleet,
5 I think it was at that time, allowed Chipman
6 to come into the area, they certainly didn't
7 foresee anything of this type happening. And
8 they did operate for something like 13 years,
9 I think, without such an incident. And then in
10 the last year they had three. And this seems
11 to be the culmination or result of all three
12 accidents.

13 We can control the zoning, to
14 the extent that our Official Plan calls for Light
15 Industry in that area, so that we would not be
16 inviting heavy industry in there. And certainly
17 in light of what's happened with Chipman, we
18 certainly won't be entertaining any other chemical
19 companies coming into the area.

20 But we do have the zoning by-laws
21 that we can apply to restrict and control the
22 type of industry that we would like out here.

23 As far as the emergency measures
24 are concerned, I think in this whole incident
25 we're seeing "Murphy's Law" come into full force
here, from the beginning to end. It just so happened,
you know, with the telephone lines not working
to the MOE, and the fact that Stoney Creek does not have




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2 a Disaster Plan in place at the present time
3 -- but we are working on one.

4 I hope that you'll try and understand
5 now that I'm the 'new kid on the block'. It was
6 certainly a 'baptism under fire'. I was just
7 elected in December, and it just so happened
8 that I didn't know anything about the Regional
9 Emergency Catastrophe Plan that had been passed
10 in August last year. We received a copy, one
11 copy, into the Stoney Creek City Hall in January
12 of this year, just a couple of weeks before the
13 Chipman incident. Our Administrator was in the
14 process of making copies and getting it ready
15 for distribution to the Stoney Creek Councillors.
16 And they had submitted, along with that, a draft
17 by-law of a plan to be put into effect by the
18 respective municipalities within the Hamilton-
19 Wentworth Region.

20 So we were working on that. And
21 when I say "we", the Administrator and his staff,
22 you know, and the Fire Chief, were working on
23 such an Emergency Plan at that time, when this
24 incident happened.

25 So I wasn't aware of what my role
was, and, as you know, we were all at a Council meeting
that night, a Council meeting at City Hall in
Hamilton, and you could smell the odour up there



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long before we heard that there had been an incident at the Chipman plant.


Upon hearing that, as you heard, the Regional Chairman and myself, the Regional Co-ordinator, Doctor Cunningham, the solicitor, Ray Plant -- we proceeded down to the site to get first-hand knowledge as to what was going on.

I understand that as far as the evacuation was concerned -- again, in hindsight, it probably wasn't really necessary, but the officials at Chipman erred on the side of good judgment and safety, and they suggested to the Regional police that an area from Jones Road to Truman Road be evacuated. And then, of course, that was extended, I believe, to 20 Highway.

Now again I'm getting into an area that's a legal...but I don't think there's anything that says a person must be evacuated and must leave their home. It's a voluntary-type evacuation. You can't force a person to leave their home unless they're in a building that's on fire or some such thing.

So there was some confusion there and it's understandable.

I think you brought up a very good point, Doug, as far as how to deal with




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2 handicapped people. I live in a high-rise condominium
3 and we're faced with the same thing; trying to
4 establish a fire plan that will take into account,
5 you know -- with the handicapped -- how we're
6 going to get them out of the building and so
7 on.

8 And what I would suggest is that
9 we set up a committee -- I would like to see
10 a committee struck, comprising of the City
11 representatives and citizen groups such as yours,
12 and the East Hamilton/Stoney Creek Health
13 Association, and representatives from industry,
14 to arrive at a plan that's acceptable to all
15 of us. And we'll get started on that right away.

16 As far as the list of the hazardous
17 materials, I think the Minister alluded to that
18 earlier. There has been an attempt in the past
19 to do that. Our Fire Department does go into
20 these industries a couple of times a year, to
21 look the plant over, and they are more or less
22 aware of some of the chemicals that are in there,
23 but certainly the suggestion made to make this
24 list available to anybody who is interested in
25 the types of chemicals that are in these plants,
26 I think is a good one.

27 Have I covered everything, Doug,
28 or is there something else?



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MR.DOUG PENDLEBURY: Have you
any idea of when it's going to be collected,
or...

MAYOR STAN NAPPER: Well, of course,
everybody, you know, wants them yesterday, but
we'll take steps to set this up immediately.

We haven't approached industry
as yet, so we've got to find a date that's suitable
for all of us to sit down. But I assure you that
we'll do this within the next month or two.


THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
much, Mayor Napper.

Joe Cummins indicated that he'd
like to have an opportunity to ask one or two
supplementary questions.

PROFESSOR JOSEPH CUMMINS: I'm
Professor Joseph Cummins from the University
of Western Ontario. I teach Advanced Genetics
and I teach a course in the Medical School called:
"Environmental Pathology and Toxicology".

I wish to talk about two explosions.
One was the dimethylate explosion of last March,
which was nearly a year ago, and a more current
explosion.

I disagree completely with the
Chief Medical Officer of Health on the health
effects of these pesticides.



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2 And in the case of dimethylate,
3 it's clear that in a similar explosion it's
4 indicated that the dimethylate gas injured the
5 genes, damaged the genes of human beings so exposed,
6 in similar explosions. It caused cancer in animals.
7 It caused genetic effects in animals. So it's
8 clearly a dreadful chemical to have around the
9 neighbourhood.

10 I urged repeatedly that appropriate
11 genetic testing be done in those neighbourhoods
12 who were influenced. This was not done, but I
13 did receive a promise from the Minister of Health
14 that they would look into the possibility that
15 there is an increase in the number of damaged
16 children born in the area.

17 Now this was roughly 12 months
18 ago, so that information should be available.

19 However, I stress to Mr. Elston
20 that the study should be a retrospective one.
21 Any other kind of study would not be appropriate
22 for the population exposed.

23 So this information should have
24 been available to be dealt with today. We should
25 know by now whether or not the dimethylate did
injure the children here.


The second explosion we're going
to talk about is the more current one, the one



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2 in January, and again we find the chemicals which
3 there's clear evidence can cause a very rare
4 type of cancer in rats. There's clear evidence
5 in Canada that it not only genetically damages
6 the cells of animals, but it damages human cells
7 in cultures, the genetics of humans. This evidence
8 of genetics is Canadian, and yet our professionals,
9 including the Chief Medical Officer of Health
10 -- he's quoted as saying he doesn't believe that
11 there will be any long-term health effects.

12 Now I think he's wrong, and I
13 think in terms of the scientific evidence available
14 from publications, that Doctor Korn
15 should not have made that conclusion, he could
16 not have made that conclusion. In the practice
17 of science, the medical bureaucrat does not take
18 precedence over the published written word. No
19 matter what the bureaucrats wish to believe,
20 no matter what they believe, that in the practice
21 of science it's the experiment that counts, it's
22 not what the bureaucrat believes.

23 So this evidence is there.
24 So some people's concern, it may be well intended,
25 you know. They may be saying: "There is no evidence"
when, in fact, they mean: "We don't agree with
the evidence that's there". But, at the same
time, it's just to calm your fears. At the same



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2 time they're preventing you from getting that
3 remedy provided by the courts.

4 What I'm saying here is, we should
5 be getting evidence, and through your citizens
6 group you should be thinking about getting evidence,
7 because if these people damage you, if they injure
8 you, then through the law you have the right
9 to seek remedy from them.

10 So these guys may be telling you
11 something that they should deal with for now,
12 but when you think about, when you think about
13 what they're doing to you in the long run...

14 So looking at all the evidence,
15 looking at all the evidence -- get that evidence
16 which is necessary.

17 Now how are you going to get that
18 evidence? Well, one way that you can get the
19 evidence is to undertake, through your citizens
20 group, the appropriate genetic testing.

21 Another approach is to look into
22 the environment around you; speaking to people
23 who live in the neighbourhood. Pups were born
24 very recently -- certainly there were dead pups
25 in this group of pups that were born in the
neighbourhood residents. However, nobody had
thought to take them to a vet and get them autopsied,
and get some determination done as to why the



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pups were born dead.


So it's keeping one's eyes open
and protecting oneself. God knows, I don't think
we're going to get all that much protection from
the officials!

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
much, Doctor Cummins.

Would you like to respond to that,
Doctor Cunningham?

DOCTOR CUNNINGHAM: I have
had some correspondence from Doctor Cummins in
regard to the dimethylate spill, and I took it
up with a Geneticist at McMaster University,
and it was the McMaster Professor's position
that Doctor Cummins position couldn't be supported.
I realize I don't have standing with Doctor Cummins,
I'm only a physician, and consequently I think
I'd rather invite him to meet with experts in
this Town and go over his literature at a later
time, because what we are really dealing with
is the persuasiveness of the literature and the
persuasiveness of the papers that don't support
the position we put forward. So I trust that
Doctor Cummins will meet with us in a small group
that we can organize, to go over his resources.

PROFESSOR JOSEPH CUMMINS: One
thing I'd like to clear again -- in the use of




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2 the English language I think it's appropriate
3 that we shouldn't say "there is no evidence"
4 when we disagree with the evidence that there
5 is. What I say is that the evidence exists, and
6 indeed how they get -- McMasters come out, and
7 I hope that they're being quoted improperly in
8 the "Spectator", because they're saying things
9 that are just not true, in the first instance.
10 When we come up with the actual references, they
11 back off and then they say: "We don't agree with
12 them". How you get these people to do that, I
13 don't know.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Actually, I
15 think we have a representative of the Ministry
16 of Health, Doctor Perry Kendall, in the audience,
17 and I ask Doctor Kendall if you are prepared
18 to come forward?

19 DOCTOR PERRY KENDALL: Good
20 evening.

21 This is a very emotional topic
22 for very many people. If I can just touch on
23 a couple of the areas in terms of the reproductive
24 effects.

25 It's true the Ministry of Health
has collected extensive data on reproductive
outcomes in the Province. If one is comparing
two groups of outcomes you need to look -- if




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2 one is expecting a certain background level of
3 unfortunate outcome: a stillbirth, malformation,
4 to see if there's been an untoward effect, one
5 needs to be able to compare two groups and know
6 the two groups one is comparing from.

7 We would not have collected or
8 collated all this information in the time that
9 Doctor Cummins suggests, because the registries
10 that we use, we look for...(undecipherable)...who
11 may not be studied or diagnosed until well into
12 the first year of growth, because not every
13 abnormality is discovered, obviously, at birth.

14 So while we will have reproductive
15 data to look at and to compare, it will not be
16 ready until at least the end of this year, so
17 we would not anticipate that we could give any
18 answers until early 1987. That's regrettable.
19 But in order to collect the data completely,
20 those are the permutations that we go through.
21 The birth has to be registered. The diagnosis
22 has to be registered. The records have to be
23 searched. And then the records have to be compared
24 with other records to make a valid comparison.

25 In terms of the other health effects,
I think there are a couple of limitations we're
looking at here. One is that there were a relatively
small number of people -- large enough if you



1
2 were one of the people -- who were exposed to
3 what must have been relatively low concentrations
4 of a chemical for a relatively short period of
5 time. Two hours is a relatively short period
6 of time, I think, compared with some of the other
7 exposure that we are still unable to find any
8 effect from. And information on these chemicals,
9 while it is inexact -- or we have not very much
10 information on some of them -- what we do have
11 suggests that there are no long-term effects
12 on human beings.


13 Joe Cummins has quoted some papers.
14 Without weighing one paper against another paper,
15 or without getting a sort of technical analysis
16 of the papers, I think it extremely doubtful
17 that there are any long-term effects from this
18 chemical if people were exposed to it for the
19 short period of time they were exposed.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
21 much, Doctor Kendall.

22 I now call on Mr. Murray Kilgour,
23 who is representing the East Hamilton and Stoney
24 Creek Health Association.

25 Mr. Kilgour.

MR. MURRAY KILGOUR: Thank you,
Mr. Chairman; Honourable panel members and Ladies
and Gentlemen.



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
My name is Murray Kilgour. I'm the Chairman of the Special Issues Committee of the East Hamilton/Stoney Creek Health Association. It's my pleasure to present this brief question paper to you at this time. Due to the amount of submissions being presented I will attempt to condense our brief. Copies will be available upon request at the end of this meeting.

The East Hamilton/Stoney Creek Health Association is comprised of community groups and individuals from the East Hamilton, Stoney Creek area. This is an elected body and is accountable to the people which it represents. Currently there are over 3,000 members in the Association.

The East Hamilton/Stoney Creek Health Association has received many calls, letters and completed questionnaires from concerned citizens in the region of the fire incident in the Chipman chemical plant in Stoney Creek on Tuesday evening, January 21st, 1986.

Most of the concerns dealt with the problems surrounding the evacuation procedure.

The association held an emergency meeting on Friday, January the 24th, 1986, to discuss the event. As a result of the meeting the Board of Directors of the Special Issues



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2 Committee has put together this brief. It will
3 also put forth some recommendations we would
4 like to see presented.


5 We have broken down the areas
6 of citizen concerns and would like answers to
7 the following.

8 The evacuation. Residents living
9 north of the Queen E from Jones Road to Highway
10 20 were not aware of the problem at the Chipman
11 plant. We confirm that some of these homes were
12 in the direct line of fumes and yet they were
13 not advised to evacuate. Why? Were they forgotten?

14 There was some confusion as to
15 what areas were being evacuated. Some reports
16 said north of Barton Street, at the same time
17 as other reports were saying north of Highway
18 8.

19 Residents were confused as to
20 whether or not they should leave. On the one
21 hand they were hearing that an area was to be
22 evacuated, and then they heard they should not
23 leave unless the police came to the door and
24 told them to do so.

25 As well there was a language barrier.
Other than English, no other warnings were issued
in any other language. This created even more
confusion in the situation. Could one side of



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the street be considered safe and the other side
unsafe?

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There were problems encountered
in obtaining accurate information. The Stoney
Creek Fire Department 'phone was jammed, and
'phoning the Regional Police number was useless,
because they were unable to answer calls at the
police station due to so many people needing
information.

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Number two, regarding the environment.
Why were officials not on the scene sooner? It
was reported that they didn't arrive until 8:00
p.m.

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Why was there no available equipment
to monitor the air?

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Why was the air monitoring equipment
at Barton and Sanford Street not able to pick
up any chemical imbalance in the air?

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Chipman has stated that they have
established a water collection reservoir to catch
the run-off from a major spill or from use of
the fire-fighting water. Is this reservoir being
constructed in a way to protect the environment,
to prevent seepages of the water into the sanitary
systems surrounding the area?

Is this reservoir checked periodically
for chemical pollutants?



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Chipman has stated that:

"APM 50W MSD Sheet (Appendix 7)

used by plant employees indicated that water or foam are recommended for extinguishing a fire. In this instance, water would have been the best medium to control the decomposition quickly."

but staff concluded to use talc, believing that this would smother most pesticide fires.


No chemical sensors are equipped and the proper staff to ensure early detection of any leakage of toxic fumes into the air.

An 'early warning' system should be placed in order to allow the residents, at the very least, a few minutes of warning of any smell or air contamination.

Medical testing of Chipman and other workers dealing with toxic chemicals should be done on a regular basis, independent of Chipman, CIL, or any other chemical company, financially or otherwise.

No immediate on-site supervisory staff were present at the time of the incident.

Information on all chemicals used at Chipman and all other chemical plants should



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2 be made available to local authorities, Ministry
3 officials, and the general public if requested.


4 Closing remarks. We wish to commend
5 the Region of Stoney Creek and Hamilton Emergency
6 Services for their quick action. At the same
7 time Council admit that they will see where their
8 plans could be improved.

9 There was definitely room for
10 improvement with the Ministry of the Environment,
11 so that people once again will have faith in
12 this Ministry.

13 Chipman Chemicals must, without
14 a doubt, assure the citizens of Stoney Creek
15 and Hamilton-Wentworth Region that such a situation
16 will never occur again. They must also be open
17 and honest with the community on all matters
18 regarding pollution of the environment by spills
19 or emissions into the air, earth or water. Following
20 this procedure, it is hoped that the citizens
21 may regain their confidence in the professional
22 integrity and community responsibility of the
23 Chipman Chemical Company.

24 Recommendations. Local health
25 authorities should initiate the necessary testing
and monitoring of citizens in the affected area
for short and long term effects.

Soil and water conditions should



1
2 be checked.

3 Information on all chemicals present
4 at any time must be given to the local officials
5 and be available for both environmental and community
6 groups upon request.

7 Lastly -- improved data and
8 information that staff create in chemical handling
9 procedures should be made available and implemented.

10 Sensors should be installed to
11 warn residents immediately of any escape of toxic
12 vapours.

13 Supervisory personnel should be
14 on site at all times when toxic or possible toxic
15 chemicals are being processed. This supervisory
16 personnel must have a clear mandate to act with
17 authority in any emergency situation.

18 A formal committee should be struck,
19 encompassing local officials, Chipman and other
20 company officials, Ministry representatives,
21 as well as the Canadian environmentalists. This
22 committee would monitor all chemical plants as
23 well as formulate an effective emergency plan,
24 both in education and implementation.

25 The East Hamilton/Stoney Creek
Health Association should take an active role
in participating in this or emergency plan project.

It is encouraging to see that



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the Chipman task force has made a similar
recommendation.

I thank you for your attention.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
much, Mr.Kilgour.

As members of the audience may
not be aware, Mr.Kilgour prepared his brief in
advance of this meeting, and it occurred to me,
as I was listening to him, that a number of the
issues that he has raised, in fact, have been
dealt with, at least to some extent, by the
presentations we have heard in the first part
of the meeting.

Mr.Napper has spoken, for example,
about the evacuation procedures; there have been
discussions about air monitoring and medical
testing, and the Ministry of Labour, of course,
is introducing legislation relating to the inventory
of hazardous chemicals. So that, to a large extent,
I feel that many of the issues that have been
raised by Mr.Kilgour perhaps have been addressed.

At the same time I would like
to open this to the panel, to see if any of them
would like to amplify at this particular point?

Jim?

MR.JIM KING: I agree with
you, Mr.Chairman, that some subjects have been



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addressed at one time or other.

I would certainly appreciate a copy of the report, because I would like to review that, to make sure that we have picked up all the suggestions that have been made.

One item that I thought was new, that hadn't been discussed, was the reservoir, which has not been used for the two years since it has been installed. It is an emergency reservoir to collect any water that might pool after fighting a fire, or to collect anything that may be a run-off from the plant. But it has not been used, we have not had any need to use that reservoir.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. King.

A quick comment from Mr. Bradley?

THE HONOURABLE MR. JIM BRADLEY:
Two things. First of all, the suggestions are very constructive, very helpful, very thoughtful. And I appreciate the fact you gave me a copy of your brief and I'll have that available to me.

Second, I emphasize again the need for input when the actual control order is drawn up for the Chipman plant, and invite your further participation, and your organization, and the public input will come in the control



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order, which will be dealing with this company
and its operations.

It's very constructive to have
this -- so many of the suggestions have been
helpful to me.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
much indeed, Mr.Kilgour.

The Chair recognizes Chuck Emberson.
Chuck is the Secretary of the Health and Safety
Committee of Local 1005.

MISS LUCYLLE BOIKOFF: Excuse
me -- you said I would be heard before.


THE CHAIRMAN: You're Miss
Lucylle Boikoff?

MISS LUCYLLE BOIKOFF: Yes,
indeed.

Is this only a 'tempest in a teapot'?
Could it be something we could ignore?

But this is not a local issue,
for one thing. It is part of the total picture
of equipment breakdown, infrastructure breakdown.
Lack of investment capital, which means that
the kind of technology we need, like infra-red
scanners, laser technology, optical biophysics,
are not being invested in, due to our paying
massive amounts of debt service to the IRS.

And this is a straight attack



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2 on industrial and the farm factor by
3 environmentalists, who are in an unholy alliance
4 with the Liberals and the NDP, who are perpetuating
5 a policy that Trudeau started, and for which
6 we voted him out of office.


7 Something called the "post industrial
8 society", or actually a feudal society, if you
9 will.

10 The environmentalists are responsible
11 for genocide a hundred times worse than that
12 of Hitler, because of the fact that they oppose
13 advanced technology everywhere. In the Third
14 World, by not spraying with DDT, it has caused
15 a recurrence of malaria, yellow fever and various
16 other diseases.

17 The real important question of
18 the environment is not at all being addressed
19 here. There is a spectre just over the horizon,
20 which is a spectre of gain. It is not a venereal
21 disease, but a disease due to breakdown in poor
22 sanitation, in starvation, and the problem is
23 that it's being spread, the virus, easily.

24 A study done in Florida -- this
25 is to the question -- I would like to ask Doctor
Cunningham why there are no quarantine laws in
effect for AIDS?

THE CHAIRMAN: I'm sure Miss



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Boikoff's questions are valid, but in a certain context.

The Chair recognizes Chuck Emberson, the Secretary of the Health and Safety Committee of Local 1005.

MR.CHARLES EMBERSON: My name is Charles Emberson. I'm the Secretary of the Health and Safety Committee, Local 1005, Steelworkers.


In reading the Chipman report, there's a few things of concern. I'll just try to brief it, sort of thing.

The Technical Manager arrived at the plant at 2000 hours. He reviewed the information. He recommended evacuation of the downwind area of approximately one kilometre.

Now the police extended that at 2045 to 5 kilometres. The police decision was concurred with by the Chipman technical advisers.

At 2040 hours CIL Medical Director said that exposure would cause eye and throat irritation. The odour was detectable at very low levels and no serious health effects were likely to exist.

Doctor Cunningham, the Medical Officer of Health for Hamilton Region and CIL's Technical Director agreed that the decomposition




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2 products the public was exposed to would not
3 lead to health problems other than short-term
4 discomfort.

5 The Medical Officer, the Regional
6 Chairman, the Regional Administrative and the
7 Chipman Emergency Co-ordinator decided to lift
8 the evacuation order.

9 Data sheets for the short-term
10 effects were available to those people, but the
11 the probable effects at the various exposure
12 levels to the toxic properties of the decomposition
13 products to the susceptible population groups
14 were not available on site. In this case computer
15 search during the night got that information,
16 but it was not available to the Chipman staff
17 and to the authorities making the decisions.
18 We hope in the future that before making decisions
19 the Chief Officer of Health will look at all
20 the information.

21 A question now for Mr.Plant. If
22 there was an emergency called that night and
23 the evacuation continued, would the Region have
24 the facilities and the equipment ready to handle
25 the need for evacuation? And where would that
be?

24 MR.RAY PLANT: I'm in Hamilton,
25 so I can't tell.



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2 I'd like to point out that the
3 response to the incident was commensurate with
4 the need at that time. If the need was later,
5 the plan could provide for the accelerated need.
6 I can only say that it responded to the need
7 that occurred at that time.


8 MR.CHARLES EMBERSON: I won't
9 make any statements on that right now.

10 The next concerns the Ministry
11 of Labour. We previously raised concerns to the
12 Minister of Labour, Mr.Wrye, in a letter dated
13 January 24th, 1986. In a response from him on
14 March the 5th, '86 he said his officials would
15 answer these concerns at this meeting.

16 The first concern we'd like to
17 ask is what procedures does the Joint Health
18 and Safety Committee develop in the handling,
19 use and storage of chemicals in the plant?

20 THE HONOURABLE MR.WILLIAM WRYE:
21 I think I'll turn this over to Brian ^{Goodman} ~~Litton~~,
22 the Executive Director of the Occupational Health
23 and Safety Branch.

24 GOOLMAN
25 MR.BRIAN ~~LITTON~~: I think that
26 we received the Chipman reports and we know the
27 information which was made available in the reports.
28 And we have ordered that there will be further
29 training, further information.



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2 I think one of the problems here
3 was that while dealing with hopper produced friction,
4 that there were no temperature monitors that
5 were available, nor was there a deluge shower
6 system that could have been used to put out the
7 fire. And in addition there was not adequate
8 maintenance to ensure that products that had
9 the possibility of decomposing if there was friction
10 -- that that wouldn't happen because of lack
11 of maintenance.


12 Chipman has, I think, very clearly
13 indicated in their report the information that
14 was available to the employees, and as you have
15 heard, the employees who were processing the
16 material were adequately protected during the
17 processing of the material.

18 Now the Health and Safety Committee
19 -- perhaps Mr. King would have some further
20 information.

21 MR. JACK KING: If you'd like
22 to redefine the question resulting from the answer
23 -- to direct it to me?

24 MR. CHARLES EMBERSON: No, what
25 we'd like to know is: did your Joint Committee
work on safety procedures in that plant?

MR. JACK KING: Yes, we do have
Joint Committees in the plant, meeting every



1 month, looking at the whole safety aspect. The
2 technical material, Safety Data Sheets, are ones
3 that are really designed and developed and brought
4 up by the medical staff as well as the technical
5 staff, and that particular information is developed
6 on location.

7 MR.CHARLES EMBERSON: Usually
8 the medical staff and the technical staff do
9 not work with the product, that is the problem.
10 It's usually the operator that's doing the job
11 that's going to be exposed, or going to run into
12 a safety hazard; it's not the medical or technical
13 staff.

14 There should be a Joint Committee,
15 with the operators on that committee helping
16 work out job procedures to make sure that their
17 job is safe and healthy.

18 MR.JACK KING: Well, the operators
19 certainly do, at the monthly meetings, have their
20 opportunity to input into the safety considerations.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: We have the
22 manager of the office that inspects this plant.
23 I was wondering could we first hear from him?
24 Mr.Barry Blyth, who is the Manager of the Hamilton
25 Office.

MR.BARRY BLYTH: To answer
your question with respect to Joint Health and



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2 Safety Committee involvement -- during our
3 investigation a number of workers were questioned
4 as to the training they had received, including
5 a member of the Joint Health and Safety Committee,
6 representing workers, and they were satisfied
7 with the training they had received with respect
8 to personal protection equipment.

9 As far as input -- input had been
10 given as far as recommendations, which would
11 be the normal procedure in any Joint Health and
12 Safety Committee, for Management to look at those
13 recommendations and to implement controls.

14 MR.CHARLES EMBERSON: Maybe
15 you want to stay up there for the next question?

16 Has the Ministry of Labour
17 investigated the frequency of their inspection
18 tours in this plant? That was another question
19 that I raised to Mr.Wrye.

20 THE HONOURABLE MR.WILLIAM WRYE:
21 I asked this afternoon, when I was reviewing
22 this chart, to have a look at the earlier
23 inspections, but unless I am wrong the plant
24 was on a 6-month cycle at the time of this incident.
25 Now, as I said, I haven't had a chance to look
at previous reports. Perhaps Barry may want to
elaborate on that?

MR.BARRY BLYTH: Yes.



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2 Previously it was on what we call a 12-month cyclical
3 inspection, and a reasonably low number of
4 contraventions indicated in those inspections.
5 As a result the frequency has been reduced to
6 a 3-month cycle, and investigations are more
7 frequent.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Any more questions?


9 MR. CHARLES EMBERSON: Yes,
10 I have.

11 Has the Ministry of Labour done
12 any in-plant air testing in that area, in that
13 plant?

14 THE HONOURABLE MR. WILLIAM WRYE:
15 I don't believe we have. I should first indicate
16 to those of you who may not be familiar with
17 the legislation, that the responsibility for
18 complying with the legislation is on the employer.
19 There's no requirement at all for the Ministry
20 to test.

21 Now, as you know, there have been
22 certain regulations passed, under the Occupational
23 Health and Safety Act, to designate certain very
24 dangerous substances as substances for which
25 there should be special controls and for which
air monitoring should be required.

There are 55,000 chemicals which
are in use, and to require air monitoring for



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all of them would be unnecessary.


MR.CHARLES EMBERSON: My concern would be pesticides, if the air is adequately monitored.

Now the next question, to go with that: in light of the problems that we've had at Chipman, will there be air monitoring done by the Ministry of Labour?

THE HONOURABLE MR.WILLIAM WRYE: We are now in the process, as Mr.Jenkins indicated, of conducting a Hazard and Operability Study, and, very simply, this company apparently, I would think, mixes or bags about a hundred different chemicals; blends or mixes a hundred different chemicals in about eight or nine machines. What we're doing is taking a look, with the company, at all the chemicals that are being processed, to ensure compatibility with machine and process.

Now, we indicated earlier that this is the responsibility of the company, to ensure compliance. It's not the Ministry's responsibility to do air monitoring in plants where there are chemicals. The company must ensure that the workers are protected.

We do periodic audits to ensure compliance, and if it's necessary for air sampling to be done, we would be requiring the company



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to do it, and making sure that their samples
are properly taken and analyzed.

If necessary, we'll send in our
own Occupational Health Branch.


MR.CHARLES EMBERSON: The next
question I have for you is: a minute ago you
did say that the very low frequency of violations.
Has there been any violations or outstanding
orders that have been issued against this company?

THE HONOURABLE MR.WILLIAM WRYE:
There have been orders issued in the past. All
orders have been complied with. No, there aren't
any outstanding violations on the company.

MR.CHARLES EMBERSON: The next
question is for the Minister of the Environment.

Has any testing or monitoring
of emissions be done at Chipman, and, if so,
what have those results been? And if not, why
not, and does the MOE plan any emission studies
in the future?

THE HONOURABLE MR.JAMES BRADLEY:
I'll ask Mr.Boris Boyko, the Regional Director,
to speak to that. I think he indicated in his
initial presentation that we're in the process
of conducting an in-depth study, including looking
at all of the emission sources from plants such
as Chipman.



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2 It's been an emphasis that in
3 recent months we've come across a number of plants -
4 to look at air emissions in a much more intensive
5 way than we have in the past. We have not had
6 the extensive stack monitoring that is necessary
7 for certain chemical plants, and that's one of
8 the intentions of the provisions of Regulation
9 308; we're in the process of going through public
consultation with a number of groups.


10 Maybe you could highlight the
11 data and intentions over the next couple of months
12 for us?

13 MR.BORIS BOYKO: Would you mind
14 repeating your question? Has there been any air
15 monitoring -- was it specifically at Chipman
-- or what was...?

16 MR.CHARLES EMBERSON: Yes. Has
17 any testing or monitoring of emissions been done
18 at Chipman?

19 MR.BORIS BOYKO: No. With respect
20 to that, not since the original installation,
21 I think, in the mid-'70's.

22 There are bag houses. The pollution
23 control equipment was looked at in the survey,
24 with respect to the type of equipment in the
25 bag houses, that sort of thing, but no monitoring
was done. So the Ministry of the Environment



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has done no emission monitoring up till now.

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MR.CHARLES EMBERSON: Is your plan now that you'll be considering emissions from that plant, and possibly go -- you said you will have the second hearing possibly in a couple of months -- and possibly order some after that?

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MR.BORIS BOYKO: The whole question of emission control, of appropriate emission control, will be looked at, and advise the raw data for existing equipment performance -- anticipated performance of that -- was looked at in the survey, and will be developed further with, as I indicated earlier -- with input from the discussion part of this meeting.

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So, yes, the accuracy of that equipment will be reviewed, as well as the need for additional equipment.

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THE CHAIRMAN: Mr.Emberson, just before you go on -- I recognize, of course, that you're asking a series of excellent questions, but, on the other hand, there are a number of people --

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
MR.CHARLES EMBERSON: I just have one more statement to make.

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THE CHAIRMAN: That will be fine. Thank you.

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MR.CHARLES EMBERSON: We're concerned of the need for public inquiries and these types of incidents to get out all the facts, not only to prevent speculation of a cover-up, but to prevent similar problems from occurring. The only way governments of all levels seem to be responsible to the people they represent, is to let them know and understand all of the facts relative to this incident, and what can be done to prevent similar occurrences.

Elected politicians, when making statements, such as Stoney Creek Mayor, Mr.Napper -- I'm talking about a public inquiry -- that the incident has become too emotional; it could justify the future in terms of new industry locating in this area. We feel that this is secondary, as it is the responsibility of the politicians to put the safety and health of the people in our environment before the production of industry.

Thank you very much.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr.Emberson.

The Chair recognizes Doctor Peter Boldrini.

DOCTOR PETER BOLDRINI: I have a question and a comment on these documents.

The question is: who has the duty




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2 to inform the public on actually and in reality,
3 if it's a national problem?

4 Up to now more than a month has
5 passed. No medical problems. We agree behind
6 those tables. No government has passed the seal
7 of danger to the public.

8 I don't know to whom to ask this
9 question, but I give you free account of why
10 the public has been waiting for written information
11 -- not anonymous, but written, anyway.

12 The first example is: we've been
13 told this evening that the nose detects substances
14 in parts per billion, but the instruments in
15 this case detected -- it actually was a hundred
16 parts per million -- that is to say, the nose
17 is one thousands times better than the instrument
18 available at that time. That is a serious statement,
19 because the nose was better than the instruments
20 perhaps one thousand years ago, but the last
21 few years indicate -- century perhaps -- there
22 are instruments, and there are instruments that
23 can handle it much better than the nose.

24 And suppose that an emission should
25 come where we would have been told, by the same
official, or some of the same officials behind
us, that nothing was detected in not hundred
million but one billion times lower than that.




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2 Some of those officials state, when they come
3 into.... and when there's something to deny,
4 they state that detection limit is parts per
5 quadrillium, parts per quadrillium, and they say
6 parts per quadrillium, one second in; in a thousand
7 minutes, three thousand litres. Which doesn't
8 make sense to the intellect. Doesn't apply to
9 this readings.

10 But an example of such things
11 as a substance which was emitted and is not mentioned
12 in the report and nobody has mentioned, is cyanate
13 or isocyanate. They don't smell, and^{so}/the instruments
14 are better to detect this material. These are
15 common in a fire of this kind of pesticide. And
16 there is also literature on that.

17 And one of these compounds, methyl
18 isocyanate, became famous -- was reported in
19 the last couple of years, one year from now.

20 So these are examples of substance
21 which is a composition product and is not mentioned.
22 Is not mentioned here. Probably -- did somebody
23 look for this material?

24 And finally, the third example,
25 referring to my question as to the quality of
material emitted -- it doesn't seem that the
officials at that time were informed, because
the plant told us that there was no quantity available



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2 at that time.

3 The newspaper quoted 260 kilograms
4 of material emitted. These reports quote 600
5 kilograms supposed of the material....

6 Now if you multiply by 260 it
7 doesn't make 600. It's not a difficult mathematics.
8 In other words, the public has not been hearing
9 the quantity at the time. I don't know what it
10 was, a hypothesis supposition or not, the quantity.
11 It certainly was supposed to be here. The data
12 that those responsible to make decisions that
13 evening should have had in their hands. They
14 didn't have it in their hands.

15 My question is: who has the duty
16 to inform the public more accurately and in writing,
17 of the three levels of government present here
18 this evening?


19 Do you want a comment?

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
21 much Doctor Boldrini.

22 DOCTOR PETER BOLDRINI: I still
23 have the comment.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Would you like
25 to make a comment, or would you like to listen
to the answers to the questions?

Your first one was related to
the sensitivity of the measuring equipment. Perhaps



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a member of the Ministry of the Environment would like to comment?

DOCTOR PETER BOLDRINI: Could you tell me who has the duty to inform the public correctly and in writing?

THE CHAIRMAN: Very well. Thank you. Who would like to respond to that?


DR. CUNNINGHAM :

We're here now, aren't we? We're having now a Town Hall meeting, and a dialogue where your concerns are being met. It's a lot better than anything that could ever been set down in writing. It's the first time I have had been at a meeting with two Ministers, outside of Queen's Park, so something is happening. I don't need to outline to you the political system, but I would point out that we're here, we're hearing what you're saying, and I think it's a lot better than something you read in a newspaper.

QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: (Unidentified and inaudible)

DR. CUNNINGHAM :

Well, it worked. And I'm glad to be here. Because all the letters I sent out obviously didn't help ease things. I much prefer this, even though my nose is the subject of discussion!



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Mr.Chairman, if I might just make
a comment here. In answer to that last question --

FROM THE FLOOR: The point that
you're making -- what was the question. The
stenographer down here would like to know what
the question was.


DOCTOR PETER BOLDRINI: I will
explain the question again. Who has the duty
to inform the public correctly and in writing?

FROM THE FLOOR: I think that
answers your question. Nobody does.

THE HONOURABLE JIM BRADLEY :

I'll take the question on, because
a number of us would like to comment on this.
Every one of us, every one of us has that
responsibility to inform the public, in whatever
manner we can. This evening, in a very comprehensive
meeting, we are attempting to provide answers;
some of which will satisfy you, some which will
never satisfy you, and that's understandable.
That's the public dialogue process, and I think
we have to accept that fact.

In addition to this, when specific
inquiries are directed to either one of us who
are Ministers, or Ministry officials, it's our
responsibility to provide as detailed an answer



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2 as possible, in as quick a period of time as
3 possible. Each one of us here has that
4 responsibility, and none of us is in a position,
5 in my view, to shirk that responsibility.

6 I suppose that some of the information
7 was provided, for instance, at various stages.

8 On the night of the incident people
9 provided -- well, you're shaking your head, but
10 if you'll let me just continue on as to the stages.

11 On the night of the incident those
12 who were in attendance had the opportunity to
13 the vital information they had at that time.
14 Subsequent to that, as the investigations take
15 place, it's then our responsibility to continue
16 to reveal that information to the public.

17 Certainly one of the stipulations
18 which I have put into effect in our Ministry
19 is that we are to provide all information that
20 the public seeks on matters of these kinds. It's
21 understandable -- the citizenry, I think, tends
22 to be generally suspicious of government, and
23 I think that's healthy for people to be suspicious
24 of the government, I think that's the way things
25 should be, and we should be forced to justify
each of the things we say.

But it is our responsibility,
collectively here this evening, to provide that




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2 information. If you have a specific request for
3 information, that you would like a reply in writing,
4 I think each one of us would be in a position
5 to provide that, and should provide it, too.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
7 much. Now would anyone else like to comment on
8 the answer to the question?

9 THE HONOURABLE MR. WILLIAM WRYE:

10 Could I just add one brief thing,
11 just so that everyone is clear. I guess with
12 my colleague here, let me just say that -- and
13 I wanted to be careful, Doctor, that you understood
14 that within certainly the responsibilities that
15 Jim and I have in each of our Ministries, it
16 would not be proper for me, in a response to you
17 on issues within the work place that are covered
18 by the Ministry of Labour and by the acts that
19 I administer, to go on and provide you with the
20 information or a full reply on matters of the
21 environment. That's the responsibility of my
22 colleague.

23 It also probably is -- and it
24 may sound for the people out there -- and I
25 understand, because I haven't been in the Government
that long, and I still remember when I was a
member of the public -- it is a little frustrating
to have to write a number of us to get a number



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2 of replies, but frankly, if you're going to get
3 the best and most thorough replies, the Ministers
4 responsible really have the responsibility to
5 reply to that.


6 So, as Jim said, on matters of
7 the Ministry of the Environment, he's quite willing
8 to provide replies. On matters pertaining to
9 my Ministry, anyone who wishes something in writing
10 -- the Doctor or anyone else here -- we're willing.
11 And as many of the people here know who have
12 dealt with us on other matters, we will provide
13 the fullest, most complete replies possible --
14 and do it as quickly as possible.

15 MR.JIM BRADLEY: There will
16 be a transcript, as well, of what's taking place,
17 so that we can capture any questions which people
18 feel were not answered adequately and to their
19 satisfaction. I think the transcript will be
20 very helpful so that we can address further replies
21 to...

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Doctor Boldrini,
23 you said you'd like to now make a comment?

24 DOCTOR PETER BOLDRINI: I'd
25 like having something in writing before I can
make a comment.

You inform the public, not me.
And I have that information....



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3 --- (THERE FOLLOWED AN EXCHANGE WHICH WAS
4 INDECIPHERABLE)

5 DOCTOR PETER BOLDRINI: My
6 comments concern page 8, in the middle:

7 "As is common with other pesticides,
8 the decomposition products of
9 (APM) are less toxic than the
10 parent compound itself."


11 This information in general is wrong. There's
12 plenty of information -- is not correct.

13 For this compound there are many
14 decomposition products more toxic than the compound
15 itself. Cyanates are an example. And in fact
16 they contradict on page 11 to say:

17 "Believing that the decomposition
18 was small, (it wasn't big)
19 isolated (it was not) and
20 controllable (it was uncontrollable),
21 a decision was made not summon
22 the Fire Department."

23 It also contradicts on page 21,
24 the top, third line.

25 "...toxic properties of decomposition
products and (something else)...is
not available on-site for most



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"products and is much more difficult
to access and interpret."

So this is my comment. That this
information is not acceptable.


THE CHAIRMAN: We recognize,
of course, that the book you referred to is the
Chipman report.

Thank you.

I'm sure that we are all aware
that the time is advancing, so consequently I
have asked that the rest of the people who have
indicated they would like to be heard, to keep
their remarks as short as possible, and also,
where items have already previously been addressed,
perhaps to indicate that that is the case and
maybe defer then to the next speaker.

With that in mind could I ask
Peter Dunn, who is a citizen of Stoney Creek,
to come to the microphone, please?

MR. PETER DUNN: My name is
Peter Dunn and I live on Millen Avenue
which is 2.7 kilometres downwind from the incident,
and I was one of those lucky people who wasn't
informed by anybody as to what was going on.
In fact we spent two hours searching the house
for a sewer problem before a neighbour 'phoned
to let us know what was going on.



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I'm very concerned about that.

And I'd like to make just two comments, in two areas that concern me.


We're being reassured by people out at the front here, and the data on which they're reassuring us is in question, and I would support some of the comments that have been made previously.

But let's look at the sampling data that was in the Chipman report.

First of all, Chipman were the only people who actually sampled the air at the time of the incident. Now, if anybody has samples of the air at that time, let's know about it. Chipman has these samples. They took them from Jones Road to Grays Road. Now when did they start sampling?

They started sampling about 3 hours after the incident started. Three hours. Now somebody has told us that we had a wind that was 15 kilometres. There wasn't anything left, you wouldn't find anything at that time. What did they look for?

They looked for APM. And what have we been told? We've been told that all the APM decomposed. So they were looking for something that they didn't think was going to be there



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in the first place.

What else were they looking for?

They don't say.

I think that causes me to be concerned.

I'd like to move on to the second topic of concern to me, and that's the evacuation.


Never, at any stage during that night, did any official contact anybody in our area about evacuation. When was the evacuation called for?

Now I don't know whether the evacuation was needed or not, but if it was, what the hell are you calling an evacuation for one and a half hours after the incident started? It was all over by then. You were telling people to get out when it was all finished.

I don't expect you to give me answers to these two points tonight, but I do expect that you prove to the people in this area that you can look after us a hell of a lot better than you did on that night.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr.Dunn, that was a very well-put two points. You said you didn't necessarily want a response now. Would anyone like to volunteer?

Very well. I'm sure that a response



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will be forthcoming and you can look forward to that in that draft order.

I now call on Candice Bullis, who identifies herself as a Technical Adviser for CHAP.


MS. CANDICE BULLIS: I am going to waive my turn, because I didn't want Doctor Cellini's opportunity to be cut short...

THE CHAIRMAN: Will you identify yourself?

DOCTOR LEON CELLINI: I'm Doctor Leon Cellini. I'm a physician here on Barton Street East. I have a family in Stoney Creek. I had to evacuate parents in the East End of Hamilton.

First of all I want to state basically that I recently returned from Dallas, Texas, where I went down to the Environmental Health Centre there, and I was very interested to learn that there were three Canadians that were in-patients in the Environmental Care Unit, whose bills were being paid for the Ministry of Health, because they know that expertise and knowledge of this in the U.S., does not exist in Canada.

And it's amazing to me how we can have someone like Doctor Cunningham come here as an expert and tell us something, and then we hear from a bunch of non-experts, or



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2 the political people, tell us that things are
3 not dangerous, things are okay; and a bunch of
4 things were burned up, and we don't know what
5 they are, and they won't hurt you.


6 It's amazing to me how the Ministers
7 can come here tonight when their Ministries are
8 just as guilty as Chipman. The Ministry of the
9 Environment is snafu; the Ministry of Labour
10 is snafu; Chipman is snafu.

11 That's the terminology that I
12 think has to be reflected here tonight, because
13 the people in this area will not be disenfranchised
14 from their need for a public judicial inquiry.
15 That's why the Ministers are here tonight, because
16 they know that 'their butts are on the line too'.

17 It's, you know, amazing to sit
18 back and see the openness that has come out here,
19 and you can sit back and say: "Wow! look at what
20 they're telling us, they're opening everything
21 up", but the reality is that you're all guilty.
22 The people of this community, their tax dollars,
23 that night were not spent wisely, and their needs
24 have not been represented.

25 As a physician I know people were
exposed. To what, I don't know, but they had
symptoms. We know they had exposure.

We need a long-term study, and




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2 my question -- I won't run on -- it's very simple, and
3 it is up to whoever feels that they should take
4 the responsibility to speak on behalf of all
5 of you, because you're all guilty of that night
6 -- will there be a follow-up health care study,
7 a health surveillance program, or will there
8 not be?

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Would Perry
9 Kendall like to comment in that case?

10 MR.PERRY KENDALL: Thank you
11 very much for your question. It's going to sound
12 like a 'cop-out', but as part of the Ministry
13 of Health, in the Public Health Branch, we are
14 a resource and advisory group, consultancy group,
15 to the Medical Officers of Health in Health Units,
16 who are the front-line persons responsible for
17 looking into the concerns of the population.

17 If you take your concerns to Doctor
18 Cunningham, Doctor Cunningham brings the concerns
19 to us, and I'm sure we could set up a forum where,
20 in more detail, the need for a health study,
21 and what we might look for in the health study,
22 and what the health study might perhaps show
23 us -- if it would be able to show us anything
24 -- could be discussed.

24 I'm not prepared to give you a
25 "Yes" or "No" answer to that question now; I



1
2 don't think it would be fair to give you a "Yes"
3 or "No" answer right now.

4 DOCTOR LEON CELLINI: Will there
5 be a decision made whether there is going to
6 be an answer?

7 If there is, then when will that
8 be?


9 There has to be a mandate set
10 for the responsibility of everyone throughout
11 this community, what these people are asking
12 you to do. You cannot sit here and tell us
13 that "maybe there's going to be this" and "maybe
14 there's going to be that". This public forum
15 is going to disenfranchise these people from
16 a "right to know".

17 MR.PERRY KENDALL: Could I just
18 suggest perhaps that the separate group who are
19 really interested in the health study could meet
20 with Doctor Cunningham afterwards?

21 --- (THERE WERE UNIDENTIFIED REMARKS FROM THE
22 FLOOR, WHICH WERE UNDECIPHERABLE AND WERE
23 NOT REPORTED)

24 DOCTOR LEON CELLINI: Let's
25 have a show of hands for a public inquiry tonight?

Well, I think that's the answer
that the people want to give you. The Ministers



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are here tonight. They have to respond to the

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need. This is what the community is telling you.

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It's not a political game. Tests aren't political,

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or medical issues. You've got to respond to the

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needs of the community and the people.

7

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
much, Doctor.

8

THE HONOURABLE JIM BRADLEY :

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I think this gentleman had a question

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-- the last one who spoke here -- a question

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regarding the expenditures that would take place

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in terms of Chipman itself.

13

In terms of the control order

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that is placed on Chipman: the procedures that

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must be changed, the equipment that must be purchased

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-- all of that will be at cost to the company

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itself, as opposed to the Ministry of the

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Environment, so I want to assure you that those

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changes which must be made will be changes which

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will be absorbed by the company itself.

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FROM THE FLOOR:

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I'm the owner of a property down there, owner

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of a house. I live right there. Now, as soon


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as you mention to anybody you live on both the

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Jones Road, they say: "Oh, where the Chipman

is. Chipman Road, not the Jones Road". Nobody



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buy the house down there.

I would like to know, if I take my share, the Ministry of the Environment takes their share -- well, let them take their share too, because they are the ones who done it once, second time, a third time.


They didn't deal the last time the sigger (phonetic spelling) got fire.

THE HONOURABLE JIM BRADLEY :

I think the comment you make is a very valid one -- the proposition that the polluter should pay.

I think it's understandable as well -- I think people have to know this beyond the boundaries of the area, what you people are going through in terms of the planet -- if you want to call it the "United Nation" of property that takes place when an incident of this kind takes place, which means that is why it's our responsibility to rectify this situation as it's been outlined tonight.

I think, Sir, you will note that none of us have been here with excuses. We're admitting where the problems were and are looking for solutions; some that we have suggested, some that you have suggested, and all going to be taken into account, and thank you very much.



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2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. The
3 next person who has indicated that he would like
4 to speak is Pat Valeriano, who is an Alderman
5 and Regional Council Member.

6 MR. PAT VALERIANO: Thanks, Mr.
7 Chairman, I'll try and be very brief, it's getting
8 on.

9 First of all, I do want to commend
10 both Ministers for being here tonight. I know
11 you have a busy schedule, and I want to thank
12 both Mr. Bradley and Mr. Wrye for being here tonight.

13 I want to comment first on the
14 Chipman report, and I do appreciate the report
15 being made to the public, but I believe it's one-
16 sided, Sir. And I don't think you should investigate
17 your own company, I think it should be done by
18 outside sources.

19 What I want to discuss about that
20 fire was that you never informed the Ministry
21 of the Environment and yet you said the Fire
22 Department had. With all due respect, it's up
23 to you to inform them, to tell them what kind
24 of chemicals were there. The Fire Department had
25 no such knowledge, and I think that's very important,
I think you'll agree with that now.

Mr. Chairman, about five weeks ago
-- and before I get into this, the point I am




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2 making, I'll come to -- but I think Doug Pendlebury
3 touched on some very good points. I think both
4 you Ministers agree. And one of the important
5 things he said: that we want immediate protection.
6 Immediate protection. I know maybe that's impossible,
7 but with that in mind, and keeping in mind that
8 you've had three spills in the last nine months,
9 from January, we want to be sure -- and this is
10 why City Council got involved in Hamilton, because
11 as Mr. Plant mentioned earlier, we still got a
12 West Hamilton in Hamilton, so we're concerned
13 also. If that was toxic, Hamilton would be very
14 much involved.

15 The motion passed by City Council
16 five weeks ago was this -- if I could just read
17 it to you -- and by the way, I want to thank Ray
18 Jenkins for his input into this, he's with the
19 Department of Labour.

20 Moved that the Department of Labour
21 have chemical experts who are
22 knowledgeable in the operation
23 of Chipman Chemical. investigate
24 with a view of making recommendations
25 to control future spills and
environmental problems.

26 Now I know, from what you've heard
27 here tonight, it may take months to bring



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recommendations or to reply to recommendations.

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What we're saying -- and I direct this to you,

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Mr. Wrye, the Minister -- is there anything can

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be done in the short term to make sure any future

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would not happen, in the immediate future?

7

THE HONOURABLE MR. WILLIAM WRYE:

8

I will ask Brian Goodman to indicate some of

9

the activities that are going on, and I just start

10

out by saying when the report was read to you,

11

the first time before the break, you will note

12

the investigation was such that the Ministry has

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been at Chipman since -- or else were related

14

to Chipman, but I know it's been at Chipman on

15

most of the occasions since January 21st, a total

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of eleven times. The investigation has been an

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exceedingly thorough one and has involved a number

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of Ministry officials, not to mention virtually

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all of the senior officials of the Division.

20

Brian, can you go a step further
in terms of outlining what is being done to ensure
there won't be any more...

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MR. BRIAN GOODMAN: The Ministry,

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as has been indicated, after a very careful

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investigation of this incident, issued a Stop


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Work Order. The company had indicated it wasn't

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going to resume production with the ALL-FILL machine,

but we issued a Stop Work Order which put the




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2 machine out of service until such time as the
3 plans and drawings were approved by our Engineers
4 -- not just that particular machine -- I think
5 there are eight or nine other machines, as I
6 understand, in the plant, that use, again, about
7 one hundred chemicals -- either mixing or bagging
8 them.

9 So we had two of our Chemical Engineers
10 from our Occupational Health Branch and one from
11 our Industrial Safety Branch, do a preliminary
12 assessment on, as I've mentioned before, compatibility
13 of all chemicals, all machines and processors,
14 to ensure that all proper information is given
15 to workers, they are trained properly; there's
16 proper maintenance, operating procedures, etcetera.
17 The company, as you've heard from Mr. King, has
18 been engaged in this exercise as well.

19 Now if there is compliance with
20 the Act there ought not to be an incident like
21 this. Had this machine been properly maintained,
22 had there been temperature monitors to ensure
23 that the temperature wasn't reached that caused
24 decomposition, then the incident wouldn't have
25 happened.

26 The workers were properly protected.
27 They were not at risk. However, as you have heard,
28 the concern is that -- it originated in the work



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2 place, the workers were protected, but it put
3 members of the community at risk. If we can prevent
4 the incident from happening in the work place
5 through compliance with the Occupational Health
6 and Safety Act, through monitoring the company's
7 adherence to the procedures, to the requirements
8 of the Act, hopefully we can avoid this in the
9 future.

10 QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR:


11 Are you satisfied, Mr. Goodman,
12 that the controls will be in place very shortly?

13 MR. BRIAN GOODMAN: Yes, I'm
14 satisfied that the orders that we have issued
15 effectively address this particular incident,
16 and the inspections that we have conducted, and
17 will continue to conduct, will ensure that the
18 company meets its obligations on ensuring that
19 its workers are protected in the course of its
20 activities.

21 Again, our mandate is confined
22 to protecting the health and safety of the workers
23 in the plant.

24 QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Of
25 course, it follows that if the workers are protected,
then the people in the outlying area will be protected
too, that usually follows?

Can I direct this question to The



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Honourable Jim Bradley?


You were talking about TAGA earlier, the Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer, and I understand that was defective the night of the incident. If that had been in operation, with the particular chemical, the APM, would that have picked it up, that particular instrument?

THE HONOURABLE MR. JIM BRADLEY:

First of all, the equipment that we had, the TAGA equipment that you have pointed out, is not an emergency response vehicle. Unlike the new equipment which we have purchased, which is a portable air analyzer which uses some infra-red basis, and can be calibrated for about a hundred organic substances, the TAGA unit is not calibrated ahead of time.

I think there was an anticipation -- perhaps the anticipation is pretty widespread, that the TAGA unit, which is used to monitor neighbourhoods, for instance, on an ongoing basis, or industrial areas on an ongoing basis, or a landfill site, for instance, as we're doing -- that had it been in operation, and even/^{it} it could have been effective -- probably not.

The equipment we have purchased now, as a result of scouring really the world for the very best that we could get, is the kind



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of equipment that can respond readily to that.

I'll ask Boris Boyko to elaborate
-- or Doctor Balsillie, to elaborate on that
particular piece of equipment and its limitations,
as compared to the new equipment --


QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Just
one quick question. The machine that you're bringing
in now for future -- I think you called it the
Air Analyzer --

THE HONOURABLE MR. JIM BRADLEY:
Right.

QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Would
that pick up the APM? That's my concern. I don't
think it would.

DOCTOR DAVID BALSILLIE: It wouldn't
measure the azinphos methyl directly, but it would
be in a position to pick out some of the breakdown
products, as would the TAGA, had it been available
that night.

The difference between these two
monitors is that the Regional Office here has
a response van, and the new piece of equipment,
which has a shoulder strap and has a hand-held
probe, will be available in that van, and can
be mobilized very quickly and out to the site
to measure the level of pollutants downwind of
the source. If it doesn't respond directly to




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2 the prime chemicals, then it will zero in on a
3 secondary chemical. And what it will do -- it
4 will provide information to us with regard to
5 'hot spots' and relative concentrations, so that
6 we will be in a position -- the Ministry of the
7 Environment and local officials here in Stoney
8 Creek will be able to provide information to the
9 Medical Officer of Health with regard to, say,
the distance downwind that he should be evacuating.

10 QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: And
11 how soon will that be available in this area,
12 is what I want to know?

13 DOCTOR DAVID BALSILLIE: They
14 were ordered March the 21st. They'll be accepted,
15 as I understand it, March 27th. I understand this
16 evening -- we had a call from Customs at the airport,
17 that they are at the airport. We'll hopefully
18 have them into the Regions early April.

19 And another thing we'll want to
20 do, because we have this equipment, which is the
21 most up-to-date equipment -- it doesn't mean that
22 we're satisfied that we've got all the equipment
23 necessary. On an ongoing basis the Ministry is
24 always looking for the latest of equipment to
25 be able to address all concerns. So we want to
continue to search for other equipment around



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the world that might be available at this date,
and is being developed almost on a monthly basis.

FROM THE FLOOR: Thank you very
much.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
much.

I'll call on the MPP for Hamilton
East, Bob MacKenzie.

MR.BOB MacKENZIE: Mr.Chairman,
there are three or four questions that are on
my mind.

I've read the Chipman Report here,
and it's a little more complete and, I think,
relatively open. But it does raise a couple of
serious questions I want to direct to Mr.King
of Chipman, and also a couple of questions I want
to direct to the Ministers.

Azinphos methyl, or APM 50W, as
I understand it, is probably the most dangerous
chemical you're using in the plant.

MR.JACK KING: It would be one
of the more toxic chemicals, yes, that we are
processing.

MR.BOB MacKENZIE: Then, while
I commend you for your openness, I refer you to
pages 22 and 20.

You've got in your report here,



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the third paragraph:

"During the first telephone conversations between plant personnel and off site supervision, the true nature of the incident was not understood."

The next paragraph:

"Specific directions to handle the decomposition were not transmitted clearly to the team members controlling the decomposition."

But on page 22 you've got:


"The APM 50W decomposition would have been more readily controlled if there had been a better understanding of the information on the MSD Sheet."

and also:

"Personnel were not sufficiently familiar with the correct procedures to be used in the event of rapidly escalating APM 50W decomposition."

And in addition to that, page 14, you've got -- in the third paragraph this is:

"Throughout the evening C-I-L Health



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2 possibly also "unit personnel were continuing
3 their computer search of North
4 American toxicological data banks
5 for additional detail on the health
6 effects of APM 50W and its
7 decomposition products."


8 I guess the question that's in
9 my mind is how you have one of the most dangerous
10 toxic chemicals that you have, being used, without
11 personnel knowing -- without knowing just exactly
12 what to do, which is why they didn't use the water,
13 as I understand it, they used the talc.

14 It still leaves a very serious
15 question in my mind as to the responsibility of
16 the company in this...

17 MR.JACK KING: Well, we certainly
18 did identify in the report that the training and
19 the communication were two areas that we must
20 work on and we must try and improve and upgrade.
21 I think we've clearly said that that is an area
22 that must be improved.

23 MR.BOB MacKENZIE: It's just
24 that I find it almost incomprehensible that this
25 dangerous a chemical could have been used without
these precautions in place. I do commend you for
saying this in your report.

I'd like to ask the Minister, and



1
2 possibly also the local Health Officer, Doctor
3 Cunningham, as to whether or not we have a list
4 of the hundred odd chemicals that are used at
5 the Chipman plant? Has that been turned over?
6 Is there any analysis of various chemicals being
7 done, that are in use at the plant?

8 I would ask why -- and I would
9 ask the same question of the Minister.

10 MR. JACK KING:

11 Maybe I can answer that question.
12 We have had discussions with the Hamilton-Wentworth
13 Region. We have had them on and off, discussing
14 all the chemicals at the plant. We have had a
15 request to do an update on all the chemicals,
16 and that may already have been submitted. If not,
17 it's very close to being submitted on the present
18 range of chemicals that we have in the plant.
19 So that is being attended to. I can't tell you
20 exactly where it stands in terms of identification.

21 MR. BOB MacKENZIE: I guess my
22 next question is: we're basing most of this evening
23 on a brief report, by a company document. I do
24 concede it has a lot of information. What I'm
25 asking the Minister of the Environment is: are
we going to have a Ministry report, or are you
relying totally on the control order that you're
talking about, or are we going to see a report --?



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2 If you're not going to have a report,
3 other than just having to rely on the company
4 report, then I think there's a valid reason for
5 the inquiry that's being asked for.


6 THE HONOURABLE MR. JIM BRADLEY:

7 Well, I think while it may be a
8 valid point when you suggest that it would be
9 irresponsible for the Ministry, or the Government
10 at least, not to provide a full report on this,
11 and the answer to your question is "Yes".

12 The specific mechanism for dealing
13 with the direct environmental problems of the
14 Chipman plant itself will be the mechanism of
15 the control order, and the public will have input.

16 But I think the point you make
17 is that with the Environment and Labour and Health
18 and all of the Ministries involved, including
19 the Municipalities and their involvement, a full
20 public report of that -- subsequent investigations
21 will be forthcoming, and I think that's a very
22 reasonable request.

23 MR. BOB MacKENZIE: Just a final
24 question for the Minister of Labour and also the
25 local Health Officer -- the "right to know"
legislation, in terms of the various chemicals
being there -- I would suggest to the Minister
that you may not have the luxury of




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2 the Federal action, in spite of the advisability
3 of having that information. And I think not only
4 knowing the various chemicals, but knowing just
5 exactly what the decomposition -- what they have
6 to say about decomposition -- because if there
7 were fumes from this material we would have had
8 a great problem, and yet we're not sure, as some
9 of the questions have stated, just exactly what
10 all the decomposition products, what effects they
11 may have had.

12 But I would respectfully suggest
13 to Doctor Cunningham that one of the problems
14 in accepting the decisions that were made that
15 night, really was contained in just the way you
16 approached it here this evening. I would hate
17 to think that the decision as to whether or not
18 we had to call off the evacuation or continue
19 with it was based not on monitoring, which we
20 obviously didn't have, but on the health of a
21 couple of healthy police officers and the --

22 I mean, it's obvious that we do
23 need results and testing, and the ability to monitor,
24 that were set up fairly late in this operation.

25 DOCTOR CUNNINGHAM: I'd just
like to agree with you. It did rely on the fact
that they were healthy young men -- when it was
happening, and I used it to come to a judgment



1
2 -- but it could have been a lot worse.

3 MR.BOB MacKENZIE: Finally --
4 -- I'm satisfied that the half-hour we took to
5 get through to the Ministry of the Environment
6 "hot line" was the result of a broken cable, whatever
7 the situation was, and I trust that that's something
8 the Minister is going to have corrected, because
9 we've had other complaints about the time getting
through.

10 THE HONOURABLE MR.JIM BRADLEY:


11 In the initial remarks I made this
12 evening I indicated that there were a couple of
13 things that emerged from that. First of all, the
14 equipment itself -- for instance, each time --
15 it's not very routine, but each time a person
16 comes on shift now, all the telephone equipment
17 is tested at the beginning of each shift, so that
18 not just the first line but the carry-over lines
19 are in operation.

20 The second is: additional staff
21 at every Spills Action Centre.

22 And the third is that there's a
23 training program for the staff.

24 The fourth is that there's additional
25 people who can be brought in on an emergency basis,
particularly when a situation such as this arises.

The fifth is, in terms of not the



1
2 people in the Spills Action Centre, but in the
3 Ministry Office itself, we have information that
4 will be coming into effect, and that is compensation
5 for standby as well as compensation for what they
6 refer to as "overtime".

7 I think all of those measures will
8 combine to see a better effort in that regard.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
10 much, Mr. MacKenzie.

11 The next person who has indicated
12 that she would like to address the meeting is
13 Sharon Lehnert from Hamilton.

14 MS. SHARON LEHNERT: Thank you.
15 My question is very short -- I don't have a
16 presentation.

17 I just had a question from looking
18 at the Chipman Report tonight. It seems obvious
19 that the greatest problem was a serious one, and
20 the machine that broke down originally, that caused
21 this problem, hadn't been maintained although
22 it had been fixed on previous occasions. It would
23 seem to indicate that there may be a problem with
24 capital equipment not being replaced sufficiently
25 often, but there is no recommendation in the report
to replace capital equipment, which now, I presume,
is 13 years old, and maybe some consideration
should be rested in it.



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Could Mr.King answer that question?


MR.JACK KING: It had been our practice to replace the workings of that machine two or three times a year. On this particular machine, it had been replaced and overhauled in August of 1985.

When we moved into a preventative maintenance program -- the idea behind a preventative maintenance program is that you monitor the wear on your machines and that you actually replace the parts prior to the part wearing out. So this is the program that we are instituting right now. It's not a case that the machines are worn out, or the age of the machine, it really is a case of the frequency of the maintenance, and we believe that the preventative maintenance program that we're going into will ensure that the parts are replaced prior to any undue wear.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for that question. Can we move along to our next person, and that is Pamela Millar from Pollution Probe.

MS.PAMELA MILLAR: Thank you very much, Mr.Chairman.


Pollution Probe is here this evening -- in the first instance we are very concerned that citizens of the Province of Ontario have



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2 adequate "right to know" legislation -- your "right
3 to know" which hazardous chemicals are being used
4 in your community.

5 My concern tonight is with your
6 comments, Mr. Wrye, that while there is legislation
7 on the table, the implication of such legislation
8 may be delayed -- I hear you say "June or September",
9 and that may be optimistic. I am here this evening
10 to suggest to the municipal leaders of this community
11 and of Hamilton, and to the citizens of this
12 community, that there may be an alternative route
13 to go; that Doctor Boldrini's question probably
14 received the answer it did because unless there
15 is legislation fixing responsibility to provide
16 you with the information you are seeking, you
will not have the right to such comprehensive
legislation.

17 The City of Toronto is proceeding
18 by way of a "right to know" by-law. I have with
19 me a copy of a discussion paper prepared by the
20 Board of Health of the City of Toronto. It proposes
21 that a municipality like yours introduces "right
22 to know" legislation at the municipal level, which
23 would require employers to report all hazardous
24 chemicals to the Board of Health; that citizens,
25 upon request, would be guaranteed that information,
be their request by telephone or in writing; and




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2 this information would be immediately available
3 to fire departments and consulting physicians
4 in the event of an accident.

5 There are a number of reasons I
6 would recommend that the citizens of Stoney Creek
7 get in touch with the City of Toronto and take
8 a look at their discussion paper. Not only are
9 we faced here with an uncertain legislative timetable
10 from the Province. Having reviewed the parts of
11 the by-law in comparison with the Provincial
12 legislation, it was our assessment, and the assessment
13 of the Toxic Substances Coalition, that there
14 are many superior -- that in many ways the Toronto
15 by-law is superior to the legislation currently
16 being proposed by the Province.

17 Specifically, of most concern probably
18 this evening, is that the by-law sets out very
19 clearly the obligations of public officials to
20 provide this information to you.

21 Now the City of Toronto has been
22 investigating "right to know" legislation for
23 the past two years and have had an extensive public
24 consultation program in developing this discussion
25 paper, and so a number of concerns like: exactly
what will the public officials -- how will they
have to respond, how quickly, what will they be
relying on? -- these things have in fact been




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2 already incorporated in the discussion paper.

3 That's not to say we don't have
4 some concerns about this discussion paper, as
5 I'm sure you will as you take a closer look at
6 it, but it's a good start. I think it would be
7 at least a first step to hold our municipal officials
8 accountable, and I guess with that I would ask
9 Mr.Napper if he would offer a commitment to this
10 body that he will pursue the lead of Toronto --
11 in investigating and developing a municipal by-law
12 which will guarantee for your citizens a double-tiered
13 "right to know" what chemicals are being used
14 in plants such as the Chipman plant.

15 MAYOR STAN NAPPER: I see no
16 reason why not, and I'll certainly take that advice
17 and follow up on it, I certainly will.

18 And I might say there was an attempt
19 to gather a list of all chemicals used, and hazardous
20 materials used, within the Region. It started
21 just a few months ago. And then, of course, we
22 had a change of Chief Administrative Officers
23 for the Region -- we have a new gentleman 'on
24 deck' now, Mr.Bill Calvert -- and I'm sure that
25 that will be one of his first priority jobs, is
to continue to gather that information. I see
no reason whatsoever why that shouldn't be available
to the public.




1 I'll tell you one thing that's
2 even more serious -- in my view, anyway -- is
3 the amount of chemicals that are being transported
4 through this City by rail and by truck. We know
5 that Chipman is here and we can maybe take some
6 safeguards against that, but it really bothers
7 me that we can have a major rail disaster, similar
8 to what they had in Mississauga, or a tanker truck
9 disaster, and that really frightens me more than
10 the Chipman deal.

11 But certainly that information
12 -- the hazardous chemicals that are being used
13 within Stoney Creek -- and I think I can speak
14 for the Region -- that yes, that information will
15 be collected, and I see no reason why it couldn't
16 be made available to the public.

17 MS.PAMELA MILLAR: Thank you.
18 My second question is for Mr.Bradley.

19 I understand that you have referred
20 on a number of occasions to a control order which
21 will be drafted in consultation with this community
22 after a meeting in June, and as well you referred
23 to charges laid under the Environmental Protection
24 Act, and I'm wondering whether or not you can
25 assure the community that any control orders which
may be instituted after the June meeting would
not include the prosecution or the charges laid.



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In other words, can you assure us that the effect of this control order will not protect the company from prosecution for this incident?

THE HONOURABLE MR. JIM BRADLEY:

I think that's a very legitimate question and the answer is "No, it will not protect the company against the further charges that may be laid as a result of this incident".

I know that some practices I think you're referring to have taken place in years gone by, that involved -- I don't know whether you call it an "undertaking" by both sides that there won't be any charges as a result of the control order. It is my intention to see the control order invoked without reference to the other charges, leaving the Ministry of the Environment open to press any other charges that it sees fit, according to the information that accumulates. So clearly the answer to that is "No".


MS. PAMELA MILLAR: Perhaps I didn't understand your answer. Does that also guarantee that those charges already laid will be prosecuted?

THE HONOURABLE MR. JIM BRADLEY:

Yes.

MS. PAMELA MILLAR: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very



1
2 much, Miss Millar.

3 The next question -- moving along
4 quickly now if we can, please -- is from Thomas
5 Giglione, who is a resident of Stoney Creek.

6 MR.THOMAS GIGLIONE: I direct
7 my question to Doctor Cunningham.

8 In regards to the exposure to APM,
9 why was testing done on exposure to APM and not
10 to the bi-products?

11 And also, how do you ascertain
12 the toxicity level of the airborne pollutants
13 and how to evacuate people? How do you ascertain
14 when to evacuate people if you don't have any
15 monitoring -- as you didn't that night?


16 DOCTOR CUNNINGHAM: The first
17 question was why did we not measure the breakdown
18 products?

19 MR.THOMAS GIGLIONE: That's
20 right.

21 DOCTOR CUNNINGHAM: I think
22 we were pretty well focused in on APM, and the
23 information I had at that time was it was the
24 most toxic agent.

25 MR.THOMAS GIGLIONE: There was
no APM emitted that night, it was the bi-product.
Why were you testing for APM?

DOCTOR CUNNINGHAM: I didn't
know that.



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MR.THOMAS GIGLIONE: I question
your authority to evacuate the citizens of Stoney
Creek.

DOCTOR CUNNINGHAM: So do I.
I didn't have anything to do with the evacuation.
I didn't recommend it and I wasn't consulted.

MR.THOMAS GIGLIONE: But you
made recommendations?


DOCTOR CUNNINGHAM: I reported
to the Chairman at 10:15 that night. The breakdown
had occurred four hours earlier, it was effectively
over. I didn't recommend any evacuation at the
time. Mike Carson and I were at City Hall, 10
minutes after 9:00, and we learned there was going
to be an evacuation -- which we had no part in...

MR.THOMAS GIGLIONE: And with
regard to psychological damage, genetic damage
-- are there any studies being performed. to ascertain
any genetic damage that refers to dimethyl sulphide
or any of the bi-products?

DOCTOR CUNNINGHAM: Briefly,
no.

MR.THOMAS GIGLIONE: Why not?

DOCTOR CUNNINGHAM: Well, at
the moment, having heard the discussion, I want
to talk to people who know more about it than
I, just what we would be testing for, in trying



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
to correlate...

I have some experience in being involved in health studies, and there was the same concern about getting contaminants over a built-up area, and we spent two or three million looking for some effect. And it is technically very difficult. And I would want to propose a discussion -- in this Town there's lots of people who can comment in various fashions as to whether it's feasible.

STONEY CREEK FIRE CHIEF BRIAN HURST:

To the gentleman who was asking about the evacuation -- the evacuation was called on advice from Chipman Chemical. I asked was there any toxicity to it, was there any danger to the residents in the nearby area? He was unsure of the product because of the decomposition, what the bi-products would be. So he recommended that he would advise an evacuation. The senior officer, which didn't happen to be Superintendent Braithwaite, but a gentleman that works for him, and myself, made a decision at that minute, that we were going to evacuate the very first section of the evacuation. That was from Jones Road to Fruitland Road, strictly as a precaution.

MR. THOMAS GIGLIONE: Why were some people evacuated to a location that was closer



1
2 to the site?

3
4 You'd have to ask Superintendent
5 Braithwaite, because I was not doing the evacuation
6 myself.

7 The reason that was done was the
8 wind direction at that time. It wasn't in the
9 path of any chemical or anything...

10 MR. THOMAS GIGLIONE: But you
11 evacuated people to a closer proximity to the
12 accident site. That doesn't seem to make any sense
13 to me.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: The next question.
15 Moving along quickly.

16 PROFESSOR JOSEPH CUMMINS: I don't
17 this crap about there not being pesticide out
18 in the neighbourhood, I don't believe it. The
19 only evidence you've got is from the people who
20 released it. The Ministry could easily have gone
21 out there, got a 10X sample. If they can't do
22 it -- they used to pay a man to do that. The Ministry
23 used to pay a man to do it. There's something
24 really 'fishy' going on here. The whole thing,
25 you know, stinks.

THE CHAIRMAN: The next person
who has indicated that he would like to speak
is John Balloch.



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MR. JOHN BALLOCH: My question is directed to Mr. King.

Chipman have admitted fault for the incident of January 21st, and have published and made public their slanted task force report. I have some concerns about the recommendations that are outlined on pages 24, 25 and 26. It's not a matter of words, although it would appear that way.

"Should be" is used in 13 of the 20 recommendations.

"Should be provided", "should be installed", "should be upgraded", "should be done", etcetera.

This is not definite. What is definite is "will be done", "will be provided".

Can we have assurances from you, Mr. King, that all these recommendations will be carried out? And can you give us a specific timeframe?

MR. JACK KING: I think you have heard tonight that not only is Chipman very interested in making all these changes and improving the safety of the plant, but also the Government agencies will also be inspecting and taking a hand in ensuring that their requirements are met. And that really has to be met before the plant starts operation.

We have made that commitment, and



1
2 I mentioned in the presentation that we would
3 not start the operation until we were satisfied
4 that it could be operated without incident, and
5 these recommendations were obviously part of that.

6 I think each one of the Ministries
7 has their suggestions and recommendations, and
8 have stated tonight that the operation will not
9 start until they are satisfied. So I think you
10 have our agreement, and our intentions obviously
11 are that we will do it.

12 MR. JOHN BALLOCH: Could you be
13 more specific in that: will these recommendations
14 be carried out previous to the Ministry of the
15 Environment reconvening the meeting to go over
16 their control procedures?


17 MR. JACK KING: Before the --?

18 MR. JOHN BALLOCH: Before the
19 Ministry of the Environment have the next public
20 meeting here, to go over the control procedures.

21 MR. JACK KING: Well, we certainly
22 want to start the plant as soon as possible. It's
23 in our interest to have them all in the plant
24 so that we can start the plant.

25 MINISTRY OF LABOUR :

I can also say, Sir, that as you've
heard indicated, we have ordered certain things
to be done. It's not "should be", it's "will be".



1
2 If they're not done, then further serious action
3 in terms of prosecution will be undertaken. We're
4 already considering prosecution relating to the
5 incident itself. Orders have been issued which
6 identify violations of the Occupational Health
7 and Safety Act. We issued orders to remedy the
8 situation. And in the event the plant becomes
9 operational, then they will be complied with prior
to the control order.


10 MR. JOHN BALLOCH: Thank you very
11 much. I have a second point I would like to make.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you make
13 it very brief?

14 MR. JOHN BALLOCH: Yes, I can.
15 Chipman is in the process now of developing their
16 emergency response plan. I would like to know
17 if this is going to be done in conjunction with
18 Regional and Provincial staff that are made available
to assist in this area?

19 We don't want something coming
20 straight from this company. We want it to be reviewed
21 and, I think previous to the review, we want input
from the Region, from the Province.

22 MR. JACK KING: Yes, the emergency
23 plans will be developed with the co-operation
24 of the Ministries, and with the local Municipality
25 and with the Region. In fact you can rest assured



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of that, yes.

MR. JOHN BALLOCH: Another quick supplement. Given the enormous industrial base that we have for the Region, any other industries that have emergency response times -- will they be subject to an in-depth review?


THE CHAIRMAN: Who would like to respond to that?

MR. DENNIS CAPLICE :
Ken Reed, from the Solicitor General, can comment generally on where the Province has come in the last couple of years with emergency plans, and the improvements that we foresee.

MR. KEN REED: Our mandate is planning the policies to provide as much assistance as we can to the municipal level. We have spent a considerable amount of time in the past few years with the Regional staff -- I cite Orangeville particularly -- in helping them develop their plan.

We have provided assurance to the Mayor of Stoney Creek that we would provide whatever assistance we can to them.

I offered him the Emergency Plans Act, 1983, which is enabling them -- it does not provide any basis for directing companies, or municipalities for that matter, to develop plans.



1
2 However, in co-operation with municipalities,
3 my experience has been that most of the industries
4 -- and here my experience is limited -- the "chemical
5 valley" in Sarnia, they have co-operated and
6 integrated their plans with municipal emergency
7 plans.

8 I think this is essential.


9 MR. JOHN BALLOCH :

10 Yes, I think it's essential. This is the industrial
11 base of Canada. The Niagara Peninsula. And every
12 industry that has chemicals, gases, etcetera,
13 dangerous substances, it's incumbent on you to
14 see that emergency response plans are adequate
15 to protect the constituents in that given area,
16 the citizens in that area.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. It
18 was my intention to try and bring the meeting
19 to a close by 11:30, and it's gone just past that
20 now, and there are two other people that indicated
21 they would like to speak to us, so perhaps we
22 could deal with those two and then wrap this up
23 as quickly as possible.

24 First, then, Mr. Peter Cassidy,
25 who lives in Hamilton.


MR. PETER CASSIDY: Thank you.
I'll try to keep my comments brief.



1 MR.PETER CASSIDY: My name is Peter
2 Cassidy. I'm a lawyer to Preston Legal Community
3 Services. I'm speaking as a private citizen.
4 Before I came to Hamilton I was involved in London,
5 Ontario, with the Pottersburg PCB contamination
6 problem there. And just a few comments.

7 First I would like to commend the
8 Ministers for coming here tonight, and I think that's
9 a very good step. They are here and they're getting
10 'flack'. They'll be getting no 'flack' from me.
11 They're to be commended for that.

12 What I'm getting tonight is a real
13 sense of deja vu. I've gone through it all before
14 in the Pottersburg PCB situation. We had a public
15 meeting there. There were officials from the Ministry
16 of the Environment, the Ministry of Labour, and
17 Health, and they were saying: "There's very little
18 PCB's. PCB's aren't dangerous and concentrations
19 aren't bad, and don't worry, don't worry". And there's
20 Joe Cummins there, standing up and saying: "PCB's
21 are dangerous in the studies and the reports", and
22 Joe is bringing up points about "hot spots", and
23 they defined certain problems where the PCB's are
24 concentrated in Pottersburg. And there are some
25 citizens there. There's a friend of mine up there
talking about people are concerned about their health.
"It's a hazardous chemical. Do you know
what it's doing to us? We'd like a health



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survey, we'd like testing, we'd like sampling".


It's the same thing. I really feel this. I mean, here's this table up here, coming down, saying: "Don't worry, it's okay, it's all taken care of". And here's the citizens. Here's Joe Cummins or whoever getting up and saying: "Look-it", you know, "here's a problem, let's look at it and deal with it".

And if I have anything I'd like to recommend, it's don't get caught up in the same bureaucracy or fiasco, you know, you were fighting before. I mean, here citizens are concerned, and I think they have a legitimate reason to be concerned.

And the officials come down here and just tell them everything is okay, don't worry about it. Listen to what they're saying.

People want very simple things. They want an independent inquiry because they're not satisfied with what has happened. And they want some sort of testing, some sort of sampling. Those things have to be done. And I urge you to meet those concerns. Set up the inquiry, do the testing -- please.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Cassidy.



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2 THE HONOURABLE MR. JIM BRADLEY:

3 Peter, I was familiar with Pottersburg
4 Creek. After I became the Minister it was one
5 of the first problems that I had to confront.
6 And certainly the citizens who were involved in
7 that in the earlier stages were those who really
8 mobilized, I think, the kind of activity that
9 you're talking about. Joe Cummins was involved
10 in the liaison in getting out there, the working
11 committee down there. Don Erskin, you mentioned,
12 was as well. And I've chatted with both of them
13 about it.

14 It certainly is an example of the
15 kind of positive input the people can have in
16 solving a problem.

17 And I take into account what you
18 have had to say about -- as you know, tonight
19 we haven't come saying that everything is fine,
20 that everything was right. I think there's frank
21 concessions that all the activities undertaken
22 were not perfect and we want to correct those.

23 But I think what's equally important,
24 and I think you point this out, is that after
25 we provide the answers that we have, and based
on the information so far this evening, we further
react to take into account the information you
have provided and others in the audience have provided,



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2 and I think that's very good advice, and I intend
3 to do that.

MR.PETER CASSIDY:


4 If I can -- one thing came up, and I think it's
5 serious -- there was a vote held here tonight
6 about an inquiry, and I'm in the back, sort of
7 muttering and grumbling away, and what I was saying
8 for a public vote is: where are the captains?
9 Here you are -- with respect -- you know, you
10 basically have decision-making power to grant
11 that. And, you know, I hear the Health official,
12 talking about, you know, ordering this health
13 test, you know, the different jurisdictional problems.
14 We went through that in London and we ended up
15 -- we had to go to the Chief Medical Officer of
16 Health, you know -- you were involved in that.

THE HONOURABLE MR.JIM BRADLEY:

17 In various ways the public's involved in that.

18 MR.PETER CASSIDY: And we ended
19 up getting a health team, you know, two doctors
20 from the United States and a professor from McMaster,
21 you know, coming down and meeting with people,
22 and finally getting the tests and samples. I mean,
23 there was so much red tape and bureaucracy --
24 cutting through to get that.

25 Okay. You're here now, listening.
You can grant those things, basically.



THE HONOURABLE JIM BRADLEY :


Well, Peter, that is a very loud message to take back to our Government colleagues, and certainly that message will be taken back.

I have heard what a lot of people have had to say. Some people are filing some written material. Most certainly I will be taking this back to my Cabinet colleagues to discuss what I've heard this evening and get, I hope, a positive response.

THE HONOURABLE MR. WILLIAM WRYE:

I would say here, there are 21 or 22 other people, including a person with the word "Premier" in front of his name, who would like us not to make too many commitments without clearing them with the entire Cabinet. That's generally the way we run things.

You know, I came here tonight. We thought we had some responses for you -- or, as Jim said, for some of the failings and some of the successes, and indeed how we have responded in the, I guess it's been two months since the incident. But I hope nobody thought that we came here tonight saying: "That's it", you know, "that's the bottom line, over and done with, complete", because I certainly didn't come here for that reason.



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2 I have obviously heard -- as has
3 Jim -- some very real concerns. There's been some
4 comments read, that I've heard in this public
5 portion of the program, and we're going to make
6 a commitment to follow up on this, and I think
7 there have to be some additional initiatives taken.
8 It's very clear that there have to be. And I think
9 you've told us that loud and clear tonight.


10 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. The
11 last, but not least -- Wayne Spinney from Stoney
12 Creek.

13 MR.WAYNE SPINNEY: Mr.Chairman,
14 thanks.

15 I'm going to talk to Doctor Cunningham.
16 The policemen would have been dead! And
17 it's too bad I don't have the authority to be able to pull
18 your tickets away, Doctor Cunningham, because
19 I think you've been very sarcastic to the people
20 that's here tonight.

21 My question, I believe, is to Mr.
22 Reeves.

23 The emergency action that was in
24 force on the night of January 21st was in the
25 least to say, unorganized, and perhaps would point
out the requirement in our community.
Without going into detail, how some area residents
found out about the problem. At the meeting back



1
2 in February or March -- March 6th -- one lady
3 said she'd found out from her sister in Toronto
4 on the 'phone!

5 Has it ever been considered that
6 an emergency procedure of blocking all the airways
7 of all TV's, radios and CB's in trucks, cars,
8 what-have-you, in the community affected, which
9 would then render all citizens aware of the situation
10 that is at hand, then the appropriate action
11 following.

12 This 'alert' system would stay
13 in effect in the area concerned until all dangers
14 were over.


15 Thank you, Mr.Chairman.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr.
17 Spinney.

18 Would anyone like to comment on
19 that?

20 KEN REEVES :

21 I don't think that anybody has
22 considered quite that draconian a measure, but
23 I do believe -- I know that a number of communities
24 throughout the Province of Ontario, anyway, employ
25 the services of the local news media to assist
them in providing information and direction to
the public. And one of my responsibilities is
the preparation and implementation of plans relating




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2 to accidents with the nuclear power generating
3 stations, and within those plans we have made
4 arrangements with selected media to provide
5 information and direction to the general public.
6 The problem, of course, is getting the attention
7 of the public first.

8 In some cases -- in the Mississauga
9 derailment, for instance, there was no difficulty,
10 because there was a very loud bang. In this case
11 and in the case of a nuclear accident, there is
12 really no external sign that anything has happened.

13 So the first point is -- one of
14 the major problems, and it's not faced only in
15 Ontario, but in North America and around the world,
16 is how do you get the attention of the public,
17 particularly late in the evening; and, secondly,
18 is getting that information to them. And the
19 information that I have acquired over the past
20 5 years is that the use of radio is probably the
21 best, and it's certainly the medium that is believed
22 most by the general public.

23 To cut off all other transmissions,
24 I'm not sure that that would be practical, or
25 even possible.

(THERE WAS AN INAUDIBLE QUESTION
FROM THE FLOOR)



KEN REEVES :

I can't comment on that. Communications is a Federal responsibility. I'm not trying to 'pass the buck'. They are the people who control -- they control communications, and they control the legislation which deals with communications right across the country, in all provinces, in all parts of the country.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

(THERE WAS AN INAUDIBLE QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR)

THE CHAIRMAN: In view of the hour it's...

Can I ask that perhaps you can make these discussions at the next meeting, or perhaps speak to the person you'd like to speak to personally, after the meeting. But we've had a large number of people who have expressed their concerns and I'd like to conclude the meeting.

Let's get the last thing done, the last order of business here today, concluding remarks from the Ministers.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Dave Christofferson and I'm the Alderman and Regional Councillor that originally put the motion to Regional Council,




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2 asking that a full public inquiry, judicial inquiry,
3 take place, and at the request of the Mayor of
4 Stoney Creek the Regional Chairman acquiesced
5 to allow this meeting take place beforehand. And
6 having been in that position, I would ask you
7 for 30 seconds of your time.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: You're going
9 to get 30 seconds.

10 DAVID CHRISTOFERSON :
11 Mr.Chairman, I had sincerely hoped that the process
12 this evening would clarify all the problems and
13 all the concerns everyone had, and I think there
14 has been an effort on your part, and on the part
15 of Chipman, the Chipman officials, to try and
16 begin that process. I really think that you have
17 tried. I think we've laid the groundwork for it.
18 I also sincerely believe, having sat all these
19 hours and listened to the concerns of residents
20 and listened to the questions after the case was
21 made by the officials, that there is still a dire
22 need for a judicial inquiry.

23 I'm not going to make a speech.
24 I merely wanted to acknowledge to my colleagues,
25 a number of whom are still here in the audience,
that I will be going back to them. The motion
before Regional Council is that should this public
forum not answer the questions that were raised,



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2 that indeed Regional Council would then go forward
3 and request that the Province conduct a full judicial
4 public inquiry, and I will asking that the Council
5 take that position.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very
7 much.


8 DAVID CHRISTOFERSON :

9 Can I say this much to you before
10 I leave? I won't make a speech. I just want to
11 say to you that the reason I'm going to do it
12 is that there was one comment made here this evening
13 that I think stands above all others, when a gentleman
14 asked that we do expect you to prove you can protect
15 us -- and I'm quoting -- "a hell of a lot better
16 than you did that night".

17 The "you", Sir, in this case, is
18 "me" also, because I'm a Member of that Council,
19 and I don't think that I can answer "Yes" to that
20 question, and I don't think you can either. And
21 I think we, the "you" in here, should ensure that
22 we do get answers, and the best way is before
23 a whole judicial and public inquiry.

24 Thank you for allowing me to speak.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: The last item
is final comments by the Ministers, and I call
on Jim Bradley to make his final remarks, please?



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THE HONOURABLE MR. JIM BRADLEY:

I'll keep it to one or two sentences, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for the excellent job that you've done in a very difficult meeting, and "thank you very much" to those citizens -- particularly those of you who have stayed until the 'bitter end' tonight.

And the last thing I would comment is -- what I really appreciate is the number of positive and constructive suggestions which you've put forward. They're certainly deserving of consideration and listening to, and that's what happened.


THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Bradley.

Bill Wrye?

THE HONOURABLE MR. WILLIAM WRYE:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to echo my colleague's comments. As Jim said, I thank you for your patience and your forbearance, and we're moving this matter along. We've had a lot of speeches, a lot of questions, and you've been an outstanding help in the matter of order.

I also want to thank publicly the residents who have stayed so long. It is clear, just from that -- that, in and of itself, is a demonstration of the great concern that people



1
2 in this area have over the incident.

3 I can only say, as I said earlier
4 on, that we will go away from tonight's meeting
5 with a greater understanding of your concerns
6 and your desires for fuller answers, and indeed
7 as the last speaker suggested -- that kind of
8 suggestion as well -- we will consider these with
9 our officials and together, and with our Cabinet
10 colleagues, and we will be back to you. This should
11 not be viewed as a conclusion, rather as a beginning.

12 I thank you for your attendance
13 here tonight.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: The object of
15 the exercise this evening, of course, was to have
16 a public review of the Chipman incident, and I
17 think that this evening we've heard some of the
18 participants, and found out what happened, who
19 it was and why.

20 We've heard some real concerns.
21 And some of those concerns are being answered.
22 We've heard that some perhaps are not being acted
23 on in a way that, as we have heard -- as being
24 considered entirely satisfactory.

25 Of course, the question that it
brings is: it is possible to do those things?

We have a thirty-day period in
which it's possible for you -- for those of you



1
2 who haven't already submitted to the Ministries,
3 either the Ministry of Labour or the Ministry
4 of the Environment, to do so.

5 And their offices are both essentially
6 at the Provincial Government Building, 119 King
7 Street West.

8 There are, of course, representatives
9 of both Ministries here in the room.

10 In closing I would like to, on
11 your behalf, thank The Honourable Jim Bradley
12 and The Honourable Bill Wrye for their attendance
13 at this meeting. It's a rare privilege for any
14 community to have two Government Ministers present
15 at one time.

16 Thank you very much.

17 I would also like, on your behalf,
18 to thank the people who made the presentations,
19 and also, of course, those panelists who were
20 here to respond to your questions during the balance
21 of the evening.

22 I would finally like to commend
23 you and thank you for your fortitude, your positive
24 suggestions, and to wish you a Very Good Night.

25 I declare this meeting closed.

--- (THE MEETING CONCLUDED AT 12:00 MIDNIGHT)

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